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Abstract
Resurrecting Eden:
Inaugural British Narration and Policy of Iraq

!
Timothy Kennett
!

The American University in Cairo
under the supervision of Dr. Walid Kazziha

!

This thesis examines Britain’s use of technology in developing Mesopotamia. British
imaginations of Mesopotamia as Eden or El Dorado, reified by a multiplicity of travel literature,
archeological digs, and geographic societies, formed the first half of a violent dialectic that
granted divine right and responsibility to the British. Instead, colonialists claimed that
Mesopotamia’s inhabitants squandered its primordial potential through neglect and
mismanagement. These justifications fueled British attempts to develop Mesopotamia, irrigation
engineers designing floodgates for the Tigris and Euphrates while agriculturalists created new
strains of wheat that would flourish in its climate. But technology was more than development. It
formed the foundation of a polemic leading to prolonged aerial bombardment and discipline; if
modernism could resurrect the Garden, airplanes would tend and cultivate it. Therefore, the value
of aircraft was not restricted to its ability for disciplining a population. Planes were physical
manifestations of the British colonial project, flying articulations of the modern that sanctioned
violence against the “primitive.” They were the latest mechanisms to embody the narrative of
English supremacy and the latest conversation topics in British high society.
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About the Documents and Comments Concerning Methodology
This thesis incorporates a large quantity of documents available at the British National
Archives in Kew. A comprehensive list of archives used can be found in the bibliography. Most
documents were either found from the Royal Air Force Archive (AIR) or the Colonial Office
(CO). War Office (WO) and Foreign Office (FO) documents informed this thesis to lesser
degree, as the Colonial Office was located in India during the period of the Mesopotamia
Expeditionary Force and the War Office, located in London, was primarily responsible for the
administration of the British Army rather than Air Force. During the MEF, the Royal Air Force
was known as the Royal Flying Corps, part and parcel to the War Office. However, near the end
of the First World War the RFC merged with the Royal Naval Air Service forming a new, distinct
branch of the military. In many ways, the reorganization of Her Majesty’s forces represents the
philosophical schism of military doctrine that would have profound and long-lasting effects on
Iraq’s (mis)management.
AIR is a collection of documents containing immense amounts of correspondence, maps,
memorandum, financial records, and intercepted telegraphs. However, operation records were
most prolific. Operation records are brief reports detailing daily activities of the Royal Air Force.
For example, if pilots attacked a village in Northern Iraq, the location, number of planes, target,
and amount of bombs and small arms ammunition used, were painstakingly recorded. Portions of
the archive are organized thematically, however, the vast majority has been collated by year and
administrative unit. To go through the entire AIR archive would have been impossible.
Secondly are the memoirs and travelogues created by British adventurists and political
elites who lived, worked, and fought in the region. These sources are meticulously detailed,
!6

many of whiter were recorded by British officers (contemporaries of T.E. Lawrence). Particularly
noteworthy is C.J. Edmonds memoir, Kurds, Turks, and Arabs, in my estimation the best primary
source of southern Kurdistan in the 1920s. E.B. Soane's and To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in
Disguise; with Historical Notices of the Kurdish Tribes and the Chaldeans of Kurdistan and A.T.
Wilson’s, 1917-20: A Clash of Loyalties, are also fantastic and requisite sources for any student
of Iraq. As a source, their greatest strength was providing voice to archival sources that proved to
be inexorably dry.
A third important source are the transcripts of lectures held by the Royal Geographic
Society and the Royal Central Asian Society. Distinguished colonial administrators,
archeologists, geographers, and engineers composed a highly exclusive society that acted as a
sort of brain-trust. These meetings articulated the narrative of the British colonial enterprise in
ways that archival sources and travelogues did not.
Several images were provided by the Aerial Photographic Archive for Archaeology in the
Middle East (APAAME) and the San Diego Air and Space Archives. APAAME is a project led
by Oxford University and The University of Western Australia containing thousands of aerial
archeology and bombing photographs. Indeed, some of Mesopotamia’s earliest images were
those of archeological sites. This is particularly significant. The historical and cultural conditions
are not inconsequential; Iraq became a prototype for aerial archeology and large-scale aerial
policing.
Methodologically, I was uncertain where to begin or what my research would reveal. I
roughly knew that my timeframe would center around the period of the Paris Peace Conference
of 1919 and the Cairo Conference of 1921. Because I had a limited time and budget (and was
!7

extremely ill), I merely dove in and waded through the plethora of British documents that
comprise the National Archives in Kew, slowing navigating through vast quantities of paper and
photographing those of interest. In the end, I collected several thousand images, mostly
comprising security and intelligence reports from a wide variety of sources ranging from
mundane operational records to the pen of Gertrude Bell.
Only after I organized, collated, and re-read my sources did I begin understanding them.
Each type of document provided a unique perspective that complimented others. Even the
prosaic nature of RAF operational records gave valuable insight concerning British intentions
and their colonial mentality. Through the eyes of the British, I grew to understand colonizer and
colonized. My research forced me to reevaluate the direction of my thesis and the original
research questions: If Iraq was contrived, its political boundaries resisting reasonable contours of
human geography, how had they remained coalesced? Furthermore, how is Iraq a product of a
postwar modernity and to what degree?1
Certainly, the AIR archive attested to the importance of aircraft throughout the Mandate
period, but I recognized it as a piece (albeit vast) of a larger story. The language and attitudes of
the colonial brain-trust, comprised of geographers, archeologists, historians, administrators, and
intelligence officers, indicated such. The construction of the Royal Air Force and their use of
aircraft was a narrative of power, a dialectic part and parcel to larger colonial schemes of
oppression. Planes epitomized the modern era, and the modern was antithetical to British
imaginaries of Mesopotamian barbary. Thus, Iraq was the product of a strange amalgamation of

1

With the assumption that the Sykes-Picot agreement was a shallow understanding of the historical and
cultural forces composing Iraq.
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ingredients: cultural memory, deconstructive imaginaries, technological innovation, and brute
force.
The greatest limitation of my Masters Thesis is the lack of Arab voice. Historian Dr.
Priya Satia makes note of this, writing:

!

The actual experiences of Iraqis caught in the web of aerial surveillance have not, to my
knowledge, been described at any length and seem a pressing topic for examination by a
Middle East historian. This article is concerned with the logic of British justifications for
the air control regime, particularly the source of Briton’s confidence in their ability to
speak for the Arab, whatever the latter’s expression of protest or approval.2

Taking this to heart, I endeavored to incorporate subaltern voices to the best of my abilities but
encountered many obstacles. First and foremost was the dearth of available material written in
Arabic about British technological or aerial schemes. This exists for many reasons, not least of
which was the Iraqi and Kurdish literary landscape and the predominance of oral tradition.
Accentuating this phenomena was the stark reality that nomadic tribes formed the foundation of
resistance against British colonial rule, their accounts are even less conspicuous. The second
limitation is my ignorance of Kurdish, although I am uncertain how much this would have
helped. The third chapter of this thesis examines aerial campaigns in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly
close to Sulaimaniyah. However, Sulaimaniyah was far from the being the cultural capital of
Kurdistan that it is today. During the 1920’s it was a rather unremarkable town of approximately
ten thousand inhabitants, one hundred fifty of whom were gunsmiths who could make high

2

Satia, Priya. "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia." The
American Historical Review 111, no. 1 (February 2006): 18.
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quality imitations of the British Martini-Peabody carbine. Thus, it was not the cultural capital it
is today.3
But I had some success, albeit limited. The Foreign Office contained a few Arab sources,
but were generally limited to treaties or correspondence between colonial administrators and ‘Ibn
Saud or some other elite. Some reports were made by normal villagers acting as informants for
the British, particularly concerning events surrounding Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniyah.
Furthermore, the library at AUC located an Arabic memoir in Iraq written by a leader of the 1920
revolt and obtained it for me.4
I consciously used the terms “Iraqi” and “Mesopotamia” interchangeably for particular
reasons. First, and most superficially, because it was a simple literary method for breaking the
monotony and repetition that would inherently occur from using a single phrase. Second and
more importantly, the British used both terms interchangeably.5 In the beginning, I toyed with
writing this entire thesis without using the term, “Iraq.” I quickly realized how the idea of
Mesopotamia, a “Western” term the British used, was equally imagined - if not more so. In fact,
this became a problem during the Armistice of Mudros of 1918 when ‘Ali Ihsan Pasha agreed to
evacuate Turkish troops from “Mesopotamia” only to settle in the city of Mosul.6

3

Edmonds, C. J. Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel, and Research in North-eastern Iraq,
1919-1935. London: Oxford University Press, 1957: 79-80. Mark Sykes ventured through the town in
1902, estimating that of its approximate ten thousand inhabitants, there were 750 Jews and 120 Chaldean
Christians.
4 Al-Bazirkan,

ʻAli. Al-Waqai' al-Haqiqiyah fi al-Hawrah al-ʻIraqiyah : Risalah Tataḍammanu
Munaqashah wa Tahlil li Hawadith Thawrat al-ʻIraq fi 30 Huziran 1920 wa Rad ma Ulṣiqa bi ha min
Muftarayat wa Tashih ma Dara Hawlaha min Akhtaʼ. 2nd ed. Baghdad, 1991.
5

Wilson, Arnold T. Mesopotamia, 1917-20: A Clash of Loyalties. London: Oxford University Press,
1931: 22.
6

Lyon, Wallace A., and D. K. Fieldhouse. Kurds, Arabs & Britons: the Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq,
1918-44. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002: 64

!10

Introduction and Background
An enterprising London paper recently offered a prize of £1,000 for the best exposition of the
Einstein theory, limited to 3,000 words. In undertaking to lecture for an hour on Mesopotamia, I have
undertaken a scarcely less difficult task.7
~ A.T. Wilson

British and Indian narratives described Mesopotamia as the land ‘between rivers’ or the
fertile crescent. In the wake of post-War disillusionment, the British saw Mesopotamia as a new
proving ground, the patient Eden waiting for the British to resurrect her by means of
modernization and development. It was both a space to be redeemed and offer redemption.8
These tropes, namely descriptions of the land as barren, biblical connections, and the saving
grace of technology and development, fueled British and Indian imaginaries of Mesopotamia.
Such narratives were not innocuous but rather represented a particular historical moment.
Timothy Mitchell writes, “Objects of analysis do not occur as natural phenomena, but are partly
formed by the discourse that describes them. The more natural the object appears, the less
obvious this discursive manufacture will be.”9 In this way, commonplace descriptions of regional
or Iraqi geographies, both physical and human, cannot be seen as self-evident but rather as
processes of deformation and reconstruction.

7

Wilson, Arnold. "Mesopotamia, 1914–1921." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 8, no. 3
(1921): 145.
8

Satia, Priya. "Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First
World War." Past & Present 197, no. 1 (November 2007): 211-55.
9

Mitchell, Timothy. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2002: 210.
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The latter half of this dialectic, “sets up the object of development as just that - an object,
not a part of the study but external to it.”10 In this way, historians have until recently
underemphasized the the role of technology in nineteenth-century imperialism. However, if we
accept imperialism as the result of “appropriate motives and adequate means,” we have a
productive point of departure.11 Timothy Mitchell, Priya Satia, and Juan Cole are a few who have
drawn focus on the tools of empire.
This thesis attempts to capture elements of those state-building processes through the
purview of aerial discipline, attempting to answer why Iraq was deemed suitable for such
Foucaultian tactics. This paper argues that Iraq became a space where geographic imaginaries
and discourses of technology intersected leading to the first large-scale aerial policing in history,
a precedent which can be felt today with the continued violation of vertical sovereignty
throughout the Global South.12 It would be impossible to understand Iraq within the guise of a
singular framework as Wilson’s epigraph suggests. Colonial administration, interagency strife
between the India Office, Colonial Office, War Office, and RAF, and the shifting aims of the
British Mandate, were all factors in shaping Iraq as a complex, and more often then not,
bewildering space.
Specifically, the India Office directed policy for the first two years until the War Office
took control over military affairs and the Foreign Office, based in Cairo, over policy. Under the
supervision of the FO, Mark Sykes led the Arab Bureau, an intelligence agency consisting of

10

Ibid.

11

Headrick, Daniel R. "The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of European Colonial
Empires in the Nineteenth Century." The Journal of Modern History 51.2 (1979): 234.
12

Williams, Alison. "Hakumat Al Tayarrat: The Role of Air Power in the Enforcement of Iraq's
Boundaries." Geopolitics 12, no. 3 (May 31, 2007): 507.
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personalities such as T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell. However, the India Office maintained
control over the Civil Administration in Iraq.
Vague Objectives
Dialogue amongst colonial elites did not question the raison d’être of colonial campaign
in Mesopotamia but rather its ability to protect the interests of the British Empire. The primary
objective of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force (MEF) was originally the securitization of
Iraq’s southern delta for two reasons. Britain’s first aim was establishing a “British Buffer State
system,” a sort of catch-all phrase which extended from Peshawar to the North-West frontier of
Afghanistan to the Caspian sea, then towards Egypt.13 Mesopotamia cushioned India by
providing territorial insurance while a military presence allowed India to protect its interests
against the Turks, Persians, Germans, and Russians. Secondly, Basra was a vital port that
connected the Persian Gulf with India. Additionally, railroads in Mesopotamia were vital
communication and transportation networks that connected the rest of the Empire together.14
However, after a quick and decisive victory in the wali of Basra, British and Indian
officers quickly turned their sites upon Baghdad. However, this force had not prepared for the
military demands required for a long-term campaign to Baghdad, evidenced by the devastating
defeat the MEF encountered at Kut. As Sluglett notes, “the speed with which the original

13

Yate, A. C. "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 5.1 (1918):
3. This was the first time I encountered such terminology, however, Lieut.-Colonel Yate uses it freely and
liberally, suggesting that this reference may be more pervasive. Western China could be included here as
well. In fact, the Royal Central Asian society held a discussion about the the Mohammadian Question in
Western China.
14

Yate, A. C. "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 5.1 (1918):
3-10.
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objectives enlarged is remarkable.”15 The “expansion” of “administrative machinery,”
particularly the establishment of a civil administration within the Basra wali was counter to the
narrative London and General John Nixon, Townshend’s superior, purported earlier.16 If the
original objective had been Basra, why advance past Amara, never mind Cteiphon, Kut, or
Baghdad? However, Nixon should have prepared British and Indian forces for an extended
campaign if Baghdad had been their aim.17 This was because the objective had never been
clearly communicated and Mesopotamia’s importance to the empire remained abstract. Colonel
A.C. Yate commented on this ambiguity:
I have studied with care the words and acts of the Cabinet in London and the Government
at Simla, and I have come to the conclusion that not a man in authority, since Lord
Kitchener left India, had any conception what a campaign against the Turks in
Mesopotamia really meant.18

!

In a frank address to the British War Cabinet, P. de B. Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations
in Mesopotamia wrote, “…I wish to point out that whatever the reasons for our occupation of
Mesopotamia and Persia may be - and the British taxpayer may be pardoned for wanting to know
what he is getting for his 20 or 30 millions a year - it is not for any military reason that we are
there.”19
Despite Yate’s criticisms of the MEF, he still believed the Berlin-Baghdad railway and
policy of Drang mach Osten or eastward expansion was the greatest external threat to India’s

15

Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932. New York: Columbia UP,
2007. 9.
16

Ibid.

17

Barker,

18

Yate, A. C. "Britain's Buffer States in the East." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 5.1 (1918):

9.
19

FO 371/5232, Memorandum, The Situation in Mesopotamia, by General P. de B. Radcliffe with
covering note by Rt Hon. W.S. Churchill, 7 December, 1920. This was the only document I found that
contained a divergent perspective on the colonial project in Iraq.
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security.20 In addition to the Baghdad-Berlin railway, another route from “Hamburg-Herat” was
proposed to further cement German economic interests with India. In his book India in
Transition: A Study in Political Evolution published in 1918, His Highness Agha Khan argued
that Germany’s foreign interests threatened Arabia, Persia, and Afghanistan; therefore, Britain
had an obligation to protect and develop these territories.
With this in mind, this thesis is not a comprehensive endeavor to explain why Iraq is the
way it is,21 but intervenes to emphasize a particular layer and narrative - namely the role of
technology in “resurrecting" the biblical landscape propagated by the British colonial project.
Fundamentally, this thesis utilizes a framework developed previously by Stanford Historian Priya
Satia and must be emphasized more in the general conceptions and historiography of Iraq,
“Existing historiography does not explain satisfactorily why Iraq in particular was deemed a
suitable place for such practices.”22 Each chapter aims to be less abstract than the previous,
progressing from a narrative of biblically to the brutal tactics of aerial bombardment, attempting
to show the existing articulations, links, and narratives permitting such behavior.
The first chapter picks up at the end of the 19th century, referring to documentation that
formed the Biblical narrative manufactured by engineers, scholars, and officers. It continues
through the years of 1914-18 when the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force fought the Turkish
General ‘Ali Ihsan Pasha from Basra to Baghdad and the Western Powers were entrenched in
Europe. In its initial phase, the MEF was led by India as the British were primarily focused on
20

Ibid, 11.

21 Although,

this primitive question certainly lies at the foundation of my inquiry. Historians and political
scientists have wrestled with this question since Iraq’s creation, even remaining with prominent Iraqi
historian Hanna Batatu until his death.
22

Satia, Priya. "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia." The American
Historical Review 111, no. 1 (February 2006): 16.
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their campaign in Western Europe. In theory, the primary objective had been the securing of
Basra’s port. However, the MEF continued to march north after experiencing early victory.
However, after a brilliant maneuver by ‘Ali Ihsan, these initial successes were short-lived as the
Turks besieged a beleaguered and undersupplied force led by General Thomson. At this point,
both the Turks and Brits had endured two devastating defeats - the British at Kut and Gallipoli
and the Turks at Suez and Sarikamish, each side experiencing extensive losses.
The Turks were not the only nation whom the British were solicitous with. The political
situation in Russia was dubious and remained a concern for the British throughout their
campaign. Lenin had taken control and Russian troops formed at the British flanks, however,
their intentions in the region were ubiquitous.
Fundamentally, Mesopotamia was a land at the mercy of three declining empires - the
Ottomans, the Russians, and the Persians, and the envy of three European nations- the French,
the British, and the Germans. In 1916, Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot negotiated a
secret agreement now known as Sykes-Picot, prematurely dividing Arabia into separate artificial
spaces - Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate and Iraq under the British Mandate, with
Mosul mostly in the French zone.23 Of course, Iraq today is most unlike the Iraq envisioned by
Mark Sykes, an individual T.E. Lawrence described:
Then there was the imaginative advocate of unconvincing world-movements, Mark Sykes: also a
bundle of prejudices, intuitions, half-sciences. His ideas were of the outsides; and he lacked
patience to test his materials before choosing his style of building. He would take an aspect of the
truth, detach it from its circumstances, inflate it, twist and model it, until its old likeness and its
new unlikeness together drew a laugh; and laughs were his triumphs.24

!
23 After

the Armistice of Mudros, the British occupied Mosul. The French were unhappy after the
discovery of oil and an agreement was made, splitting oil revenue roughly 75-25 to the British.
24

T.E Lawrence, Seven Pillars Of Wisdom: A Triumph (London: Vintage Books, 2008), pg. 57.
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Despite their occupation, many of their original designs were based on Ottoman maps. Vast
cadres of linguists, agriculturalists, and academics comprised the RGS, RCAS, and Cairo Office
for many years. The ever popular narrative of Iraq’s artificiality suggests the country was
designed by several overworked and unpaid interns on a Friday afternoon.
The second chapter, “Technology as Development: British Visions and the Value of
Mesopotamia,” highlights the structural shifts of the British Empire after the First World War.
The British developed Mesopotamia from two different perspectives. First as British and Indian
cultural imaginations perceived the natural or innate characteristics of Mesopotamia - a Biblical
garden from time immemorial that could be cultivated to support humanity.25 Thus, cultural
imagination was not innocuous. Rather, the Civil Administration articulated these notions within
public policy, evident by the presence of irrigation engineers and agriculturalists. But Iraq
exhibited external or structural value to the Empire. Within an atmosphere of monetary
constraints, evolving technology, and a unique geographical space (a buffer zone for India),
Mesopotamia furnished the empire with a territory perfectly suitable to link the colonies by air
while affirming a dialectic of superiority by means of modernity.
The third chapter, titled “Technology as Discipline: How Airplanes Disciplined Shaikh
Mahmud,” focuses on a formative period of Kurdish and Iraqi history that is simply
underemphasized. The Cairo Conference of 1922 marked a severe policy shift for the British in
Mesopotamia, namely transferring military operations from the War Office to the Royal Air
Force because of monetary constraints and improving technological advances. This shift had far
reaching consequences and was the final articulation of technological and military superiority.

25

Parfit, J. T. Mesopotamia: The Key to the Future. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917.
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Thus, in light of the previous chapters, the RAF was not just an administrative body but a
materialized a particular understanding of the colonial project (themselves) and temperament
towards Iraq (others). For the first time in human history, extended aerial policing was used to
quench the Arab Revolt of 1920 and Shaikh Mahmud, a Kurdish agha from Sulaimaniyah who
was aided by informal Turkish forces until 1925. While the Lausanne Conference began in
September 1922, both Turkey and Britain waged a proxy war that engulfed the entire North-West
Frontier. More than an interrogation of colonial power, this chapter is a history attempting to
fulfill voids in secondary literature by highlighting the figure of Shaikh Mahmud, who
proclaimed himself “King of Kurdistan” and was instrumental in forming a Kurdish nationalism.

!
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Technology as Divine: How a Biblical Dialectic Rendered ‘Iraq

!

!

“There is a story that Eve, when she left, wept copiously and that her tears grew into the bush, which was still
growing prolifically on the Mesopotamian front. The berries on it were known as ‘Eve’s tears.’26
~ British and Indian troops referred to Amara as, ‘The Garden of Tears.’

The meanings of “Iraq” and “Mesopotamia” were ambiguous in the early 20th century.

Sykes-Picot and a plethora of other designs outlined its physical boundaries, but few were in
agreement. Turkish and British generals would witness the effects of such ambiguity firsthand.
Ottoman records never used the term “Mesopotamia,” a Greek word translating to “[Land]
Between Two Rivers.” However, British travelers and orientalists had used it with regularity for
over a century.
Furthermore, as the initial campaign of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force
(1914-1918) shifted its sights northward, away from the objective to secure the port of Basra and
towards Baghdad, the geography and administrative districts of Iraq morphed thereby distorting
the definition of “Iraq” further. The Ottomans governed Iraq as three separate wilayets, Basrah,
Baghdad, and Mosul. When the Ottoman Empires and the Allies signed the Armistice of Mudros,
‘Ali Ihsan Pasha signed an agreement with the British War Office that he would evacuate
Mesopotamia and all hostilities would cease by noon on October 31st, 1918. However, he
evacuated to Mosul with the understanding that Mosul was a separate region than Mesopotamia
and hostilities nearly broke out on November 7th when the British delivered an ultimatum to ‘Ali
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Pasha to leave or else be eradicated.27 Effectively, British troops occupied Mosul illegally,
forever disrupting its regional commercial and social geographies.28
Of course, such confusion was not limited to physical locations but interfered with the
conceptions of “who” constituted as Iraqi, a discussion that never became passé and became
particularly poignant with the British evacuation of Sulaimaniyah in 1922.29 Colonial records
reflected such uncertainty, the RAF labeling operations under headlines such as “The Kurdish
Question,” or the “Mosul Question.”30 Referencing the “Kurdish Question,” in a lecture at the
Royal Central Asian Society six years after operations began near the Iraq-Iran border, the
former Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson said, “It is, of course, a very difficult thing to
fix a frontier in a region like that. Administrative officers are inclined to extend their functions:
no one quite knows where the frontier is.” Thus, when Kurdish refugees began flooding to Erbil
and Tikrit, the British Civil Administration wrestled with the applicability of the Iraqi election
law and ideas of self-determination - a question that continues to resurface until today. A
telegraph from the Foreign Office dating January 31st, 1922, reads, “I [am] not quite clear what
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is implied of reference to ambiguity of word, “Iraqi,” and nature of risks involved, and requests
explanation.”31
So how did the British imagine Mesopotamia, a region imbued with as much
nomenclature as there are people groups? British narratives of the Orient can be traced back to
the early 19th century when affluent English travelers, often steeped with a knowledge of Latin,
Ancient Greek, and the histories of Herodotus, recorded their adventures in numerous memoirs.
The descriptive nature of these works are imbued with the illustrations of landscapes and fauna,
sketched maps, and encounters with the Orient. But such positivism did not lie dormant but set
into motion newfound cultural understandings and imaginations.32 Thus, narrations of the Orient
were not innocuous but rather instrumental in rendering Palestine and Iraq as Biblical, first as
sites of intrigue, and later as justifications for British and Indian statecraft in Mesopotamia.
The danger of such cultural discourses were real. Bell, Soane, Lawrence, Stark, Wilson
and numerous others who travelled Palestine, Persia, and Mesopotamia, intertwined racial
discourse throughout their writings, not just of the Arab but the Kurd, Assyrian, Yezedi,
Turkoman, Armenian, and others.33 The Royal Geographical Society (RGS) and Royal Central
Asian Society (RCAS) were composed of an intimate network of colonial administrators,
geographers, engineers, and officers. Both served as an open and multidisciplinary space to
exchange knowledge and updates on expeditions and campaigns.
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Bell and Lawrence, along with many other British personnel, made Akaba to Aden
legible with a myriad of scientific feats - botany, cartography, and topography to name a few.
With an audience at the RGS, the Keeper of Antiquities at the British Museum, D.G. Hogarth
gave a lecture titled War and Discovery in Arabia. Lectures focusing on the archeological
exploits in conjunction with the military endeavors of the British military in Mesopotamia were
commonplace in the RGS and RCAS forums. In his lecture, Hogarth praises British efforts to
survey the territory between Akaba and Yeden between 1916-19; no longer was it the land of
“terra incognita” as he affectionately called it.34 He also described how Lawrence referred to the
Nefud steppe as “el-Hul,” or a “barren void” that lacked any animal life or vegetation.35
Consequentially, these individuals imbued their descriptions with geographic
determinism, ascertaining how the physical environment shaped the minds and personalities of
Mesopotamia. From Orientalism, “Now this attempt would have been impossible had it not also
been believed - in classical empiricist terms - that mind and body were interdependent realities,
both determined originally by a given set of geographical, biological, and quasi-historical
conditions.”36
More broadly, these geographical and quasi-historical elements are reflected in the
didactic literature of J.T. Bannister’s, A Survey of the Holy Land; Its Geography, History, and
Destiny which was published in 1844. His purpose was to address increased demand of biblical
evidence with “Sacred Geography and History,” which would “elucidate the sense and display
the beauties of the Sacred Text.” He did this without visiting Palestine or Mesopotamia, writing
34

Hogarth, D.G. "War and Discovery in Arabia." The Geographical Journal 55, no. 6 (June 1920): 423.

35

Ibid, 434.

36

Said, 232.

!22

this voluminous work on the experiences of other orientalists. Believers would benefit by
experiencing the Bible, either personally or through the memoirs of other travelers:

!
!

With how much greater impression shall we read the narrative of the location of our first
parents in Paradise, of the events which happened to them there, and their expulsion from
it, when in your imagination, we can fix on a spot in the map of the earth, and say, ‘There
all these occurrences took place.’ With how much greater impression shall we read the
story of the Deluge and, when we readily recur to the country where the ark was built,
can follow its course, from the point where it began to float to that which it rested, when
the waters retired from it;

Bannister’s work represented a growing trend and fascination among Western authors,
particularly the British, with Biblical historicity in the late 19th century. This sentimentality
continued through the 1920s but diverged from archiving to cultivating.
An irrigation engineer known as Sir William Willcocks was excited about Mesopotamia’s
commercial prospects in 1903 and made preliminary designs for improving its waterways. The
Foreign Office had been dubious about the engineer’s claims about its potential, but by 1904 a
third-party supported his assertions and Willcocks had preliminary irrigation designs drawn by
1905.37 Willcocks published a tantalizing account of his experiences surveying Mesopotamia in
1909 in a lecture at the Royal Geographical Society.38 Along with his colleagues at the RGS,
Willcocks spent a considerable amount of time theorizing about the exact location of the Garden
of Eden. Colonel F.R. Maunsell asserted that Eden was most likely found east of Elam in the
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southwestern Persian province of Pusht-i-Kuh while Willcocks was inclined to believe that its
location lay near the juncture of the Euphrates and Tigris, near Kurna or Amara.40 He also
concluded that the poplar wood found in the Euphrates valley and was the same used by Noah to
build his ark.41 In fact, the irrigation engineer was so confident and faithful in the ability of
modern technology, he proclaimed, “If Noah had been a hydraulic engineer, he would have
constructed the Pison river escape instead of an ark, and saved not only his family but his
country as well.”42
Iraq was continuously imagined as a timeless space. Such articulations teemed
throughout the travelogues of English pilgrims, never becoming passé but rather fetishizing and
thus, reifying the human and physical geographies of the region. In his return from a diplomatic
mission from Persia 1834, James Baillie Fraser visited numerous towns and cities throughout
Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. Besides commenting on their customs, dress, and hospitality, he
commented mercilessly on tribal personalities and characteristics, using terms like “creature,”
“dwarf,” or “monkey.”43 Where many inhabitants failed to develop the region or use basic
farming tools such as ploughs, it became a reflection of their character and supported the notion
that time moved more slowly and spaces were empty and unpopulated.44 Heude, Porter, Rich,
Groves, Mignan, and Fraser, all travelers of Kurdistan and Mesopotamia in the early 19th
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century, were all complicit in establishing a discourse which continued throughout the mandate
era.45
Canon J.T. Parfit, known by as his friends as “the Rural Dean of the Garden of Eden,”
was a parish priest living in Mesopotamia and the turn of the 20th century.46 In 1917 he
published a work Mesopotamia: The Key to the Future organized in sections titled: Its Ancient
Glories, Its Dreary Desolation, and Its Future Prospects. He writes fondly about the region’s
ancient past and contributions to civilization - weights and measures, astronomy, and
mathematics. In the tradition of past writers, he evokes imagery from the Hebrew Scriptures,
citing such locations and events as: “Nimrod,” “the Flood,” and the “plain of Shinar [and] the
Confusion of Tongues.”47 He soon contrasts Mesopotamia’s past glory with its current state of
neglect, inhabited by impoverished persons who fail to cultivate the land. Frogs, insects,
scorpions, and centipedes were so bountiful he contended, “Mesopotamia is now the ideal
entomologists’ paradise.”48
The exploits of Major E.B. Soane, who first began working for the Imperial Bank of
Persia in 1902 and later for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, are well documented in his memoir,
Through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise.49 He ventured into Kurdistan as a Persian
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returning to Shiraz after living in Europe.50 In his travels to the Zab Rivers north of Mosul as a
Captain, E.B. Soane refers to Genesis 10, “And Cush begat Nimrod: he began to be a mighty one
on the earth…Out of that land went forth Asshur, and builded Nineveh, and the city of Rehoboth,
and Calah, and Resen between Nineveh and Calah: the same is a great city,” while previously
mentioning the “hordes of savage people” who continue to inhabit the lands near the Zagros
Mountains.51
In 1921, then president of the RGS, Francis Younghusband reflected that if the oriental
was not ignorant, he was lazy for not taking advantage of the resources available to him in the
desert.52 The Geographical Journal’s publication “The Influence of Nature on Japanese
Character,” in 1924 further illustrates notions of geographic determinism that spread to the Far
East and continued far later than the early exploits of the first English explorers.
Traveler and journalist Freya Stark who travelled the Hakkiari Mountains by herself in
1931 made several journey’s through Mosul, Hamarra, and Baghdad, waylaying at ancient sites
of civilization and touring the stories of the Bible.53 These later dates are important and
demonstrate how compelling the Biblical narrative proved to be, despite Britain’s more concrete
security and commercial policies after the Great War. She commonly visited the tombs of past
characters, such as Job in Nineveh or Esther and Mordecai’s in Persia. From these influences, she
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wrote about Iraq’s primordial past and the timeless character the region possessed. Indeed, she
wrote, “Mounds of buried villages float above the mists like islands, and the horizon melts in
dust to the south. Stubble blows loose in autumn over undulations whose wheat or barley once
enriched the black-bearded Assyrians, and here the flocks move from morning to evening in their
migrations, with one shepherd ahead of them and one behind them, under the clinging discomfort
of their own dust.”54 Such descriptions were commonplace, relocating Mesopotamia within the
timeless and mythological annals of ancient literature such as Nights of Arabia.55
Not only did these descriptions of the Orient position populations as primitive, they were
the first half of a dialectic that justified British interventionism. After numerous decades of
observing and archiving their knowledge, British colonialists commenced land surveys and
archeological excavations throughout the Shatt al-Arab. Commenting on a lecture presented by
A.T. Wilson, Paleographer and Biblical Scholar, Sir Frederic G. Kenyon said, “I should like to
say that if we take up the responsibility for a country like Mesopotamia or Palestine, we assume
a responsibility for its past history as well as its present and future.”56 In this way, the British
aristocracy took it upon themselves to safeguard the annals of history while simultaneously
establishing their virtue. However, unique to Iraq rather than Palestine was it being Adam and
Eve’s home, and thus the site of original sin.
Perhaps more importantly, such descriptions were essential in establishing the moral and
civic superiority of the British. Control of “subject races” should be morally defensible for
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British Imperialism to spread. In fact, according to Lord Cromer, this was the “keystone” to
imperial power. While the military was important for the general maintenance of the country,
“deliberate oppression” or mismanagement would undo the Empire just as it had the Romans.57
But the Brits had a secret weapon to combat egotism and other political maladies. Cromer writes,
“Christianity is our most powerful ally.”58 The Christian moral code should be spread throughout
the Empire if the British were to succeed. Thus, travelogues did much to establish imagery of a
Biblical Eden waiting, even beckoning, to be saved by the masculine Empire.
But the British had more tools at their disposal than the stories of English travelers. With
the capture of Baghdad in 1917, the British began archeological digs under the supervision of
Captain R. Campbell Thompson, a prominent Assyriologist working as an intelligence officer.59
He began work in Nasriyah and the city of Ur, where he discovered the foundations of Ekharsag, Ê-makh, and a palace of the kings Ur-Nammu among others.60 Another individual, Dr.
H. R. Hall from the British Museum began archaeological work in December 1918, “on behalf of
the Civil Administration.” Besides visiting Nippur and Babylon, he assisted administration by
creating regulations for the transport of antiquities.61 His preliminary findings led to further
excavations in 1925 at the site of ‘Ur, co-led and funded by teams from the British Museum and
the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania.
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Excavations such as these were not restricted to the confines of Mesopotamia but part and
parcel to a larger colonial agenda to understand and revive the ancient glories of the past. As the
British Empire expanded, so to did its archeological program, both historically and temporally.
Said makes reference to British biblical narratives and the accession of the oriental framework,
“Reference points were no longer Christianity and Judaism, with their fairly modest calendars
and maps, but India, China, Japan, and Sumer, Buddhism, Sanskrit, Zoroastrianism, and
Manu.”62 So, while Mesopotamia offered new opportunities to reorient its efforts to reclaim the
sites of Genesis, it was also a space to further British preoccupations with the occult.63
To aid the efforts of the British Museum, the RAF used “air archeology” for the first time
in Mesopotamia. One of the earliest instances occurred when Lieut.-Colonel G.A. Beazley led
efforts to photograph and create a “six-inch survey” of the area surrounding Sammara.64
Afterwards, surveyors would transfer the photographs to a plane-table and conduct ground
surveys when necessary. These early efforts uncovered an ancient city that otherwise would have
remained unnoticed. Additionally, topographers recognized a complex irrigation pattern in the
landscape that further reinforced a narrative of Iraqi negligence and fall from glory.
Later, O.G.S. Crawford and Dr. Hogarth approached the RAF requesting that any
photographs of archeological and geographical interest should be sent to the Society of
Antiquities and Royal Geographical Society.65 Consequently, Crawford obtained thousands of
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photo negatives from the RAF for analysis, such services typifying the symbiotic relationship
between the military and antiquities department throughout the Mandate era. Corroborating the
effectiveness of air photography to identify archeological sites, Percy Cox said, “I have for years
known ground and been over it time after time without being able to recognize any system of
irrigation or line of foundation which at once became obvious from the air.”67 For this purpose,
surveyors conducted flights throughout the countryside, taking photos of sites such as Hatra,
Nineveh, and Selecuia and unearthing points of interest which would, have otherwise, been
unseen.
Sir O.G.S. Crawford, archeologist and pioneer of such practices concluded his lecture at
the Royal Geographical Society stating:
The aeroplane, merely as a means of conveyance, is by far the best invention of man, for it is
swift, safe, and comfortable. As an instrument of archaeological research it is (with a camera)
second only to excavation, and sometimes even more effective. The photographs shown on the
screen - a selection only from 1700, the nucleus, I hope, of a great national collection - will
inaugurate a new epoch in oriental studies. The future of exploration, and not only of
archeological exploration, is literally in the air.68
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As the airplane become an extension of the map with its ability to monitor populations
“continuously” or “semi-continuously”69 cartography allowed the British to perpetuate the
narrative of unchanging landscapes while simultaneously monitoring tribal movements. In fact,
the Royal Geography Society (RGS) and Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS)
maintained close relationships with Military Operations 470 and the Arab Bureau based in
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Cairo.71 Both Gertrude Bell and T.E. Lawrence worked intimately with the RGS for extended
periods of time. Bell often made corrections and comments on Middle East map sheets and
Lawrence began his career under the tutelage of David George Hogarth, RGS Councilman and
Keeper of Antiquities at the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford. In fact, it was Lawrence’s 1911
journey to Damascus with Hogarth, allegedly under cover as an archeology trip but really an
intelligence-gathering operating on the newly planned German railway to Baghdad, that sparked
his interest in the Middle East.72 It was also Hogarth who referenced the first aerial survey of
Medina, incorporating photographs in his research.73 Truly, the plane could unravel the mysteries
of the Orient.
Air photography aided the map-making operations of the RGS and GSGS. Using newly
decided stereoscopic plotting machines, an observer could take overlapping photos of the plane
and using methods of triangulation, calculate the height and distance of either a monument or
Turkish military fortifications. In this way, Mesopotamia represents a particular cultural moment
for British colonialists and its use of aerial technology. With these newfound advances, British
administrators, archeologists, and military strategists could test the abilities of air surveillance as
both a method to monitor and render its history, land, and people. Concerning the relationship
between scriptural geography and science, Aiken writes, “Science was seen as an undertaking
which explained God’s created world, and privileged the place of God’s revealed truth in it.”74
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By making the landscape legible, air technology and newly developed cartographic techniques
unearthed the ancient glories of Iraq’s primordial past thereby reifying the supremacy of the
modern and the frequent narrations of neglect written by British travelers and high society.
Three years after the conclusion of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force in 1918, the
campaign fast became burdensome. The Royal Air Force had just suppressed the Arab Revolt of
1920, setting precedent for the first extended aerial police action in human history. As Sir
Michael O’Dwyer, perviously Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, stated, “At one time we were
told Mesopotamia as an El Dorado, which would revive the ancient glories of Babylon and
Baghdad; a few years more and the cold fit comes on, and we are told that Mesopotamia is a
millstone round our necks, and that we must clear out at the first moment.”75 The reference to
“millstone” is not a coincidence. Rather, it is a reference to Mark 9:42, Luke 17:2, or Matthew
18:6, which reads, “And whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that believe in Me, it is
better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.”76 In
this way, even the campaign’s struggles were articulated both within a biblical and primordial
framework.
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“Air Photograph of Railway Station Bab el-Ambari, Medina”77
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Technology as Development: British Visions and the Value of Mesopotamia
“I do not think it possible to imagine anything more like a practical paradise than the country
near Asnah. Every tree and crop must have been familiar to Adam except the cotton crop.”78
Willcocks, Irrigation Engineer
English travelers, British officers, and colonial administrators created vast collections of

literature that emphasized Mesopotamia’s glorious past. It was the land of our Biblical
forefathers and incubated the magnificent civilizations of old. But now it lay destitute and
neglected by Turks and natives alike. If the first half of Britain’s dialectic created a sublime
cultural imagination, the second part appealed to Mesopotamia’s potential. But it needed
Britain’s help, “No government can be formed in the Middle East in these days without our
support and assistance…” said High Commissioner A.T. Wilson.79 Colonel A.C. Yate concluded
that the eastern portions of the British Empire, “stretching from the Shatt-el-Arab to the Suez
Canal,” would fail without its “mistress” - Britain.80 But the Empire offered the saving grace of
development and would restore the nation to rival - or even surpass - the achievements of its
primordial civilizations.
However, such descriptions were not innocuous but rather formed the building blocks for
colonial land management and population control. British colonialists saw Mesopotamia’s worth
from two perspectives. First, was Mesopotamia’s worth as cultural imagination formed it. Thus,
narratives of Eden and connections to past grandeur considerably influenced institutions like the
Agricultural Development Scheme. For example, the ADS introduced new agricultural crops to
78
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fulfill Mesopotamia’s natural destiny as the world’s garden or breadbasket (or the qualities that
Britain saw to be innate or internal). A second perspective focused on the strategic importance of
Mesopotamia within the external structural demands of the British Empire. These, of course,
included rudimentary necessities like foodstuffs and oil, but then incorporated more complex
abstractions like becoming an Indian thoroughfare. A British vicar stationed in Mesopotamia
begins the third chapter of his monograph, “Mesopotamia: the Key to the Future,” with:

!

It is no exaggeration to say that the whole world’s peace, its progress, and prosperity hang
largely upon the settlement of the many problems associated with this unique country of
Mesopotamia. (1) The development of its natural resources is a matter of some importance to
multitudes (2) The reopening of its ancient highways and the construction of great trunk
railways to India and the Far East are matters of still greater importance, especially to the
inhabitants of the Eastern Hemisphere.81

While cultural imaginations fueled British interventionism, another reality was Iraq’s value as a
resource-laden buffer-state that could, in theory, sustain itself and link London to Australia.
The Prospects of Development and Mesopotamia’s “Natural” Characteristics
In 1909, irrigation engineer William Willcocks evaluated the watering systems of the
Babylonians, attributing their prosperity to their ability to discipline nature, “From the
Lamentations of Jeremiah we may gather that Mesopotamia in olden times was rich and
prosperous, by reason of its irrigation works, and that it became ‘a desolation, dry, and a desert’
when a flood overwhelmed those works.”82 The Tigris and Euphrates annually flooded the land
“from time immemorial.”83 He asserted that the first priorities of any hydraulic engineer in
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Mesopotamia were to protect the region from flooding and reduce the quantity of silt in irrigation
water. By Willcocks’ estimation, the Tigris and Euphrates carried four times as much sediment as
the Nile, thus handicapping future prospects of agricultural development.84 This concern proved
prophetic as the land around Baghdad flooded in 1915, preventing farmers from their sowing
crops. Even in 1916 the ground remained too moist for crops.85
Willcocks proposed that engineers should construct flood gates on the Tigris and
Euphrates. He estimated these water relief structures would cost an estimated £6,000,000. He
boldly proclaimed at the Royal Geographical Society:

!

…[They] would by themselves double the value of every acre of land in the delta; be a
godsend to Baghdad and every other town and village; and allow the Baghdad railway to
traverse the cultivated land, and not, as at present proposed, cling to the deserts as Noah did
his ark. The engineers who aligned the railway have shown a timidity which would have cost
them their lives in the times of that arch-engineer Marduk or Nimrod. They have fled from
Tiamat.86

Accordingly, if such difficulties were overcome and managed, Mesopotamia could produce a
million tons of wheat and twice that in cotton. However, even if such quantities could be grown,
Willcocks wrote that merchants were concerned with their ability to move it, “Every merchant
and man of business I have talked with in Baghdad is convinced of one thing, and that is what
the backward state of the country is due in great part to the fact that while communication is
open by river with the east, it is to the west that the whole produce of the country wants to find a
way.”87 Thus, he proposed the creation of a railroad which would connect the major
cosmopolitan areas, particularly those upstream from the port of Basra. This was known as
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“Willcocks’ Scheme,” which would connect Baghdad and the Mediterranean through Hit and
Homs.88
The imagery of the Garden of Eden and its relationship to agriculture was highly familiar
to the Foreign Office. Said Archibald Sayce, Reverend and Chair of Assyriology at Oxford, in a
lecture titled The Garden of Eden and Its Restoration, “You saw the pictures this evening - you
saw the unirrigated land, and then you saw the irrigated. I visited both those sites, and that is just
what you see. We want to acquire all the country between those two rivers, to make the whole
length of it just one great productive garden.”89 Additionally, the commonplace presence of
archeologists at RGS meetings which detailed colonial aspirations further demonstrates a strong
marriage between cultural production and development.
Elements of geographic determinism, primordialism, and the ability of technology to
govern nature are present elsewhere:

!

All history is largely dependent upon geography, but in no part of the world is that more
true than in the case of Babylonia. Babylonia was the gift of the rivers, and it was made
inhabitable by the irrigation works carried on in times which we now call prehistoric by
the earliest engineers of the country.90

The antiquated glories of Mesopotamia’s past were so pervasive in British society that Sir
George Cunningham Buchanan, the eventual mastermind behind the reorganization of Basra’s
port, wrote a four-part series in The Times berating British efforts to develop it. He challenged
Mesopotamia’s romanticized image and questioned the motives of the British War Office; the
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British would need incredible amounts of capital for the protection of people and property,
establishing communications, heightening agricultural development, and increasing trade. He
questioned the ambitious schemes of William Willcocks, arguing that engineers should
strengthen the natural lines of the Tigris and Euphrates and irrigation restored incrementally.91
However, far from a patron saint, Buchanan’s discord was rooted in general disdain for the
territory rather than post-colonialist critique.
Agriculture and Oil
In her memoir Forest Venture: Conquering the Deserts of the Middle East published in
1960, Louis Maitland recalls her husband Victor Kennard comparing Middle Eastern terrain and
soils, “Now Syria is quite different; it’s thinly populated and, from what I hear, there’s a lot of
good land. Obviously it could support a much larger population if agriculture and industry were
developed.”92 Vic, who was a forestry and soil conservation adviser with the Development
Division of the British Middle East Office, praised the efforts of wheat, barley, and cotton
production.
In 1919 the principal exports amounted to eleven million pound sterling, the majority of
which came from dates, grain, and wool. A.T. Wilson saw value in developing Iraq as both an
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exporter of agricultural and pastoral goods and as an emerging market for consumer goods such
as British and Indian tea. He saw little or no potential in Iraq for manufacturing.93
When the British and Indian Expeditionary Force landed in Basra on November 6, 1914,
taking charge of local governance shortly thereafter, they found the population to be without cash
or credit for a variety of reasons. The Turks had left a highly disorganized system that proved
ineffective and highly bureaucratic. Such inefficiencies along with a particularly poor date
season exacerbated the abeyance of trade towards India and Baghdad.94
Cognizant of its success in Egypt, Mesopotamia’s Civil Administration was excited about
the potential of cotton.95 But Mesopotamia differed from Egypt. Large tracks of land remained
uncultivated throughout summer because of high salt, lime, and alkali content, issues less
pronounced in Egypt. These decreased organic materials and nutrients in the soil. In response,
agriculturalist and Major C.R. Wimshurst discovered that alfalfa and clover are attracted to lime
and alkali; farmers would drastically increase organic levels if they plowed these plants under the
soil before sowing cotton seeds.96Thus, cotton became a viable cash crop that cultivators could
sow during the summertime when farms remained fallow.
The Administer of the Agricultural Development Scheme, Mr. Garbett, was in charge of
all military cultivation undertaken through 1918. The ADS imported irrigation pumps to reverse
the impacts of long-term drought which had befallen the region in 1915. This was originally
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administered by Captain R. Thomas who was sent by the India Office in the capacity of Cotton
Expert to the Administrative Authorities in Mesopotamia. He created an experimental farm under
the supervision of the military and implemented of a large commercial production scheme. Most
importantly, Thomas conducted experiments with various types of cotton to ascertain which
yields were best, concluding the seed “Webber 49” produced the best cotton. The crop was
renamed to Mesopotamian White or “Mesowhite” for short.97 By 1919, the British Cotton
Growing Association secured leases from A.T. Wilson to continue cotton production with the
conditions that the BCGA would gin, bale, and market the crop as well. In order to achieve
commercial levels of quality cotton, the council of the BCGA created a cotton-gin plant outfitted
with new pneumatic presses and machinery that could spin up to six-thousand cotton bales
annually.98 Between the years 1921-24, cotton production rose from sixty bales to over 2,500 and
nearly all production was overseen by the BCGA.99
In 1919, the Agriculture Department transferred from the War Office to the Revenue
Department - advantageous for several reasons. Throughout 1918 and 1919, British revenue
officers carefully catalogued and archived the returns derived from duties and taxes as a way of
monitoring the population. Individuals whom the British suspected to be sympathetic to Turkey
had their lands sequestered. This prevented any undue remittances from reaching Turkish hands
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while ensuring production was maintained and thus revenue.100 Ultimately, the Mandate
government saw revenue obtained through crop shares as an “outward and visible sign of the
Arabs’ alleged submission. Payment of revenue is considered the measure of allegiance.”101
Unfortunately, some tax officials abused their authority by bullying weaker farmers to a tax they
truthfully could not afford.102
The Revenue Department served another purpose. Many inhabitants worked for the
aghas, pashas, and sheikhs who could afford to purchase land but tribes dominated the rest of the
country. Farmers composed a semi-nomadic feudal class that was greatly scorned by Bedouin
tribes. Tribes were typically more powerful than the settled communities of the north, with
exception of Baghdadis, many of whom served as bureaucrats and were loyal to the Ottomans
before the British Mandate.103 Thus, the Revenue Department was an organization that could
illuminate the social construct of Iraq, “…which is so closely inter-related with the agrarian that
the one cannot be understood without studying the other. Thus, the tribal system as we find it in
Mesopotamia, that is to say, settled or half-settled agricultural communities, rests at bottom upon
an economic basis controlled by agrarian conditions.”104 If the British could successfully develop
an agrarian society and increase the amount of landed peasants, Iraq could be governed more
smoothly.
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But agriculture was not Mesopotamia’s only resource as the evolving objectives of the
Mesopotamian Expeditionary force reflects. By March, 1917, a year after the demoralizing loss
of the Kut garrison to the Turks, General Maude captured Baghdad along with the BerlinBaghdad railhead.105 Afterwards in a telegram, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, William
Robertson, reiterated the goals to Maude’s replacement, Lieutenant-General William Marshall as:
“the establishment and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad wilayat” and “the
protection of the pipe lines and oilfields in the vicinity of the Karun river.”106
Despite the War Office’s orders to Marshall, the extent that oil dictated initial British
policy in Iraq is debatable - particularly before 1918 and the end of the India Expeditionary
Force (I.E.F. D). The Indian government was not interested in protecting Persian oil fields in
Abadan, confirming in 1914 if a British Petroleum agreement “contains [any] provisions
imposing further responsibilities on the Government of India.107 While the British understood the
strategic importance of oil, particularly in the northern province of Mosul near Hit and Khaniqin,
many officials in the Foreign Office believed it penultimate to agricultural production.108 The
emphasis on oil, or lack thereof, is summarily made by political officer C.J. Edmonds, who
managed the region of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniyah in the 1920’s:
Although the world press was wont to represent the battle as part of a gigantic struggle
for the control of oil it is interesting to look back and recall how very little oil figured in
our calculations, at my level at any rate; I do not remember a single document in which
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oil was mentioned as a factor of outstanding importance, as distinct from the general
pattern of trade, both import and export, which made the three wilayats a single and
indivisible economic unit.109

Doubts remained high, first because nobody knew how much oil existed; second, they would
have to invest incredible amounts of capital to extract it; third, the British would have to install
an oil pipeline stretching five-hundred miles through northern Iraq and secure it.110 As such, the
Civil Administration was hard pressed for resources and continually ran cash-deficits. The
budget deficit was Rs. 45,135,407 for the fiscal year of 1920-21.111 In the wake of the Great War,
English taxpayers were still financing an Iraqi campaign that was increasingly unpopular. If the
British were to address their financial plight, they would have to hedge their future on cash crops
like dates and cotton. Former Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson was so confident in the
ability of agriculture, he still believed in 1925 that the British and Iraqi governments would
derive more revenue from wheat production than oil.112
But this did not prevent attempts by the British to exploit Iraq’s natural resources. The
Turkish Petroleum Company, Limited was converted to Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited in
March of 1925 and the Deutche Bank conceded its German holdings in the company. The AngoPersian Oil Company (APOC), Americans, Dutch, and French, split a £3,000,000 investment
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equally with each party jointly owning a 23.75% share.113 However, full agreement regarding the
rates, areas of concessions (APOC had lands independent of their holdings in Iraq Petroleum
Company), and location of the the pipeline remained in negotiation until a supplemental oil
agreement was finalized in March of 1931. France wanted the oil pipeline in French-controlled
Syria while British stakeholders believed a more expensive line from Palestine to Haifa would be
easier to protect from Bedouin raids.114 Therefore, the securitization of the Mosul wilayet
depended on oil concessions made later in the campaign. Consequently security remained in flux
throughout the nineteen-twenties, treated throughout British records as “the Mosul Question.”115
Where cultural imagination influenced agricultural policy representing the innate, natural, and
quasi-historical attributes of Mesopotamia and its Biblical past, oil came to symbolize Britain’s
technological prowess and increasing reliance during the second half of the mandate period.
Trains, Planes, and Automobiles - Iraq as a Throughfare
The strategic importance of the Suez Canal can not be understated as it was the primary
passage from which the British could reach India. However, air routes began to challenge the
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historical and strategic monopoly of maritime passages. As the British weened themselves from
the restrictive nature of steam power in favor of oil, cities such as Basra and Mosul began to
exhibit strategic importance apart from their proximity to India. The Mesopotamia Expeditionary
Force’s primary objective had been blocking Turkish control of Iraq’s only port and the broader
water basin that forms at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates.116
Throughout MEF campaign, military planners were less concerned with utilizing aircraft.
The lack of a concise objective for the first two years, interagency and government competition
for control, and general lack of foresight from British command, created immense disfunction
and disorganization through 1916. For example, the Foreign Office guarded its role negotiating
with the Ottoman Porte, even withholding information from London and the India Office as was
the case during the Baghdad Railway discussions.117 Meanwhile, dysentery, disease, and heatstroke plagued Indian and British troops who were ill-equipped and suffered the brunt of
administrative ineptitude. Colonial administration understood a schematic and technological
overhaul was sorely needed. Many of the naval vessels were too large or heavy to travel
upstream towards forward developments and the port of Basra was so congested that some ships
waited six-weeks to unload their cargo.118
The Indian Administration was the first to respond by sending shallow-hulled ships to
navigate the channels of the Tigris and Euphrates. Attempting to redeem their catastrophic
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Portion of Sketch Map of Baghdad-Haifa Road (657 Miles)119
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campaign at Kut, Indian nationalists were always eager to export their technocratic
imperialism.120 However, many of them were poorly constructed or cheaply outfitted boats that
were piloted by inexperienced captains. George Buchanan took control of the Basra’s
reorganization, and slowly, with many bumps and bruises along the way, Buchanan used his
port expertise to establish a sense of order in the Basra wilayet. In addition to increasing numbers
of properly outfitted medical supply ships and the number of tugs and steamers, the campaign
received newly developed weaponry - mortars, machine guns, and hand grenades - items that
would give the MEF a technological edge over their Turkish opponents.121
A complex array of political, economic, budgetary, and technological factors, formed the
foundations of British maintenance throughout Mesopotamia. These variables were not stagnant,
but rather evolved and were in constant renegotiation with one another. Thus, aerial schemes and
policing methods cannot be seen as independent or derived purely from military concerns, but
rather the result of an equation which remained fluid until the British mandate ended.
Of course, the British colonialists developed rail and motor routes in conjunction with its
air-routes. After the First World War, London had extravagant ideas about connecting the entire
empire regardless of vehicular method. German presence in North Africa had ceased thereby
creating a marvelous opportunity for the British to take advantage of their presence. Cairo was to
become the Empire’s transit centerpiece with rail, road, and ferryboat routes sprouting (or at least
proposed) frequently.122 These modes of transportation created a complex network of routes
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heading south towards Cape Town. Eight-hundred miles of water ways connected the north and
south, and twelve-hundred miles of road.123 More routes headed east towards Beirut, Damascus,
and eventually Baghdad. If Cairo was an important transportation node that connected London
with Africa, Baghdad would become the link that united India and Australia.
The first blueprints for an overland route connecting the Mediterranean to the Persian
Gulf had been designed as early as 1835 by Sir Colonel Francis Radwan Chesney. Palmerston
financed the route in 1836, thinking Mehemet Ali’s control of Egypt and SyriaHe had proposed a
route going from Alexandria to Aleppo, down the east bank of the Euphrates and towards
Kuwait.124 Willcocks echoed the need throughout his agricultural reports. If crop production
increased, farmers would have to transfer their goods to international markets.125
Germany had also understood the strategic importance of Mesopotamia and for several
years developed a railway line from Constantinople to Baghdad. In 1888 the Deutsche Bank
secured the trust of the Porte allowing the Anatolian Railway Company to obtain a concession to
construct the railway.126 Besides its economic advantages, train would allow the rapid transport
of German and Ottoman troops east to Persia and south to the port of Basra. Prior to World War
I, the German built Baghdadi railway had created incredible angst for military strategists. This
fear was part and parcel of greater British misgivings toward European encroachment near its
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Indian doorstep. It even aided the Ottomans to quell rebellions in distant parts of the empire.127
By 1919, over nine-hundred miles of railway connected Mesopotamia, most of that between the
Basra-Baghdad-Khaniqin line (most built by the Germans).128
Domestic routes were vital for farmers to transfer crops to Iraq’s metropolises. Air
Minister Lord Thomson emphasized the importance of creating railway in addition to air routes.
He underscored the necessity to connect Constantinople to Baghdad and Basra, in order for
commercial goods and connections to be further maintained with Western India.129 Because the
British continued to develop Iraq’s railways, two systems predominated - meter gauge and
standard gauge. Meter gauge ran from the north to Basra, composing a primary trunk line.
Several lines branched from this trunk toward Karbala and Nasariyah, yet these variances created
logistical problems for the British.130
However, the commercial and economic feasibility of rail was questionable. In order for
any commercial route to work, whether it be air, road, or rail, there must be markets to support
them. Installing railways was expensive and would have to traverse the Zagros mountains of
Western Persia to reach India. At the end of the war the railway systems in Mesopotamia were
valued at three million pounds. After years of improvements and extensions, the entire system
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Nairn Transport Company at Rutbah Wells Fort, 1937, Anbar Governorate131
was only worth one million pounds because of the market and difficulties sustaining the line.
Profits were not high enough to cover depreciation, never mind its protraction.132
Major Van Ness proposed light-rail alternatives outside the primary trunk line. They would be
more commercially sustainable and their smaller gauge tracks could navigate mountainous

!
131

Clapp, Frederick. Ar-Ruṭbah (Iraq), Near Eastern Transport Company Bus at Rutbah Wells Fort. May
1937. Frederick G. Clapp Collection, American Geographical Society Library, University of WisconsinMilwaukee Libraries, Milwaukee. Accessed November 3, 2014. http://collections.lib.uwm.edu/cdm/ref/
collection/agsphoto/id/21568.
132

Ibid, 36.

!52

Nairn Transport advertising their road to Baghdad.133
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regions more easily.134 Despite the use of smaller gauge tracks, portions of the Zagros were still
too treacherous for rail, particularly in parts of central Kurdistan near the cities
of Rowanduz and Rania. Thus, the British relied primarily on automobiles and aircraft to traverse
the eastern steppes.135
The Curious Case of Rutbah Wells and the Cairo-Baghdad Air Route

!

Rutbah Wells exemplifies the conjoined efforts to network Mesopotamia by road and air.

Other roads became important arteries linking Baghdad to Persia, and thus India. The Nairn
Transport Company was famous for its pioneering services across the region.136 Nairn owned an
outfit of plush Cadillacs and Fords to make trips comfortable. It made some of the first journeys
by automobile across the Syrian Desert and mostly transported along the route of BeirutDamascus-and Baghdad. East of Baghdad, more roads connected Mesopotamia to Persia. Before
the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian transport companies were active throughout northern Iran and
and the Brits continued road construction to Shiraz and Bandar Abbas.137
June of 1915 marked the beginnings of the Royal Flying Corps in Mesopotamia which
had, “started life with two obsolete Maurice Farmans sent down from Egypt only a few weeks
before. Both had been assembled in time to reconnoitre over Qurna during Gorringe’s advance at
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the end of May, but one of them, which was constantly having engine trouble, was lost
subsequently during the Nasiriyeh operations. Two Caudron aircraft replaced them but were
hardly much better. Maurice Farmans were troublesome aircraft that needed constant repairs,
difficult to perform when there were few mechanics and even fewer spare parts. Both planes and
pilots were unaccustomed to flying in tropical weather.
The large geographic discrepancies of Iraq created numerous performance problems for
the RAF. Aircraft technology was still in its infancy, and Mesopotamia’s climate offered a wide
range of mechanical challenges. Dust and debris was always a concern, but so too were the galls
sweeping in from the Hakkiari Mountains of Southern Kurdistan. The sweltering summers could
reach one hundred and twenty degrees or more for extensive periods of time. Person and
machine became overheated and rudimentary radiators had to be improvised until tropical
radiators arrived from England.138 The arrival of Martinsyde Scouts marked a shift in aircraft
technology. They were considerably more powerful than Maurice Farmans despite their meager
eighty-horsepower.139
It was during the spring and summer of 1916 that another fundamental shift occurred. To
the instigation of Lt.-General Sir Percy Lakes, the War Office appointed Maude to take command
of the campaign. Maude rose fast through the military chain of command, developing a
reputation his efficiency and attention to detail. In addition, he saw the value of aircraft and made
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a point to fly rather than drive.140 In March of 1917, Royal Air Corps tried to bomb the
Baghdad-Samarrah railway, pilots landing their planes while explosive charges were attempted
to be set on the train tracks (T.E. Lawrence was famous for such hollywood antics).
If the RGS and RCAS were at the forefront of imperial strategy, the creation of air routes
and the general use of aircraft were, perhaps, the most prominent conversation topics. Aircraft
equipped the empire with newfound degrees of communication and transportation while
exemplifying the technological supremacy of the British Empire. Aerial archeology and
newfound cartographic methods documented humanity’s land and timescapes as never before.
Speaking at the RGS (with inaugural Secretary of State for Air Winston Churchill in attendance),
Control General of Civil Aviation and Major General Sir Frederick H. Sykes, who was a leading
visionary and developer of imperial air routes, recognized the, “strange sequence of events
whereby the problem of flight was solved just in time to assist in the conduct of war…”141
Concerning the ascendancy of aircraft, Sykes quotes himself:

!

The navies of the world will have to relinquish their present proud position; their rôle is
that of a floating defence. The Air Service built up on join Army, Navy, and Civilian
foundations is in the foremost line. Fortresses, arsenals, dockyards, Government offices,
factories of war material, are protected from the air…142

As Sykes openly admits, the emergence aerial dominance during the First World War and the
preliminary Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force empowered British administrators to clear a
causeway for innovative statecraft; The minds of Britain’s colonial architects, scattered
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“Weeding the Aerodrome”143
throughout Arabia, forged policies that matched the developments of the modern in abstraction
and novelty. Before the space age there was the plane age, and Britain was in the driver’s seat.
Strictly speaking, Britain was not located marvelously in the center of its empire;
however, more broadly, the geographic conveniences enjoyed by the empire-at-large was
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unparalleled. With England controlling Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, it could reach anyplace
on earth by establishing wireless communication and fuel stations throughout its territory.
Thus, both the Levant and Mesopotamia became vital links of communication, not
necessarily exhibiting value on their own but rather as thoroughfares. Such conceptions fueled
British desires to equip Cairo with “an Empire aerial organization,” thus, “endeavouring to urge
forward the latest development of our Western civilization in the new territory.”144 In the same
lecture, the Captain P. D. Aceland praises the efforts to develop commercial aircraft, partially
through the modification of warplanes such as the Vickers-Vimy, a heavy-bombing machine that
evolved into a civilian cargo and transport plane. While Frederick Sykes understood the wartime
advantages of imperial air routes, he understood the importance and probable usurpation of
military interests with civil.
The Royal Air Force continued to reify the strategic importance of Iraq throughout their
imperial campaign throughout the 1920’s. “The Cairo-Baghdad air route represents the first fruits
of this policy, maintains air lines of communication between the garrisons of Egypt, Palestine,
Trans-Jordania and Iraq, and constitutes an essential link in a chain which is hoped will in the
future prove capable of extension first to India, and ultimately [?] via Singapore”145 Air-routes
would connect the entire British Empire and even Australia, London to Melbourne becoming a
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five-day journey; in comparison, the journey from Baghdad to Basra by steamboat took a
week.146
Of the eight hundred and thirty-three miles that formed the Cairo-Baghdadi air route,
planes crossed four hundred and sixty-seven of these over the Arabian Desert. It was the first
stage of an air route that would continue to India and then Australia, thus connecting the entire
British Empire while simultaneously improving communication. Air-Commodore BrookePopham lectured on the emerging strategic importance of the air route, “Normally, a letter going
from London to Bagdad travels via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, Bombay, Karachi, the Persian
Gulf, and Basra, and takes between five and six weeks, thus making Iraq, from the point of view
of communication one of the furthest outposts of the Empire. The air route is altering all of this. I
have seen in Baghdad a London paper only nine days old. A pilot has arrived in Baghdad eight
and a half hours after leaving Cairo…A regular fortnightly mails service is now running in each
direction.”147
The creation of an air-route is more difficult than flying from one location to another.
While aircraft technology had drastically improved since during the First World War, planes still
waylaid at aerodromes to refuel. Sir Francis Younghusband asserted that the RGS would
endeavor to locate the next “Liverpools” and “Portsmouths,” those places that served as the
“docks and ports” of the air service, throughout the empire.148 Thus in 1919, surveyors from the
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RAF struck across the desert in Ford motorcades to locate suitable landing locations across the
desert. Each runway was located forty miles equidistant from the next, serving as stoppage points
for planes flying to Baghdad from Cairo or Damascus.
In the Anbar province the British created a strategic refilling station at the site of Rutbah,
more commonly known as “Rutbah Wells” because of its oil. Heading West, it was the last
sizable town suitable for British transportation to resupply. In fact, during the American invasion
in 2003, Major Gavrilis located the police station at Rutbah, which had been built by the British
in 1927 and subsequently used as company headquarters during throughout operations in
2003.149 The land and air routes coincided with one another from Baghdad to Rutbah, where
automobiles and planes could conveniently land and refill “every twenty to twenty-five miles.”
At Rutbah, the routes diverge - cars continuing to Damascus and planes toward Amman and
Cairo. Regarding its potential, Lord Thomson lectured at the Royal Central Asian Society, “I
believe that route has got infinite possibilities. I would early like to develop it, because it seems
to have so much importance for the whole of our position in India.”150
Mesopotamia’s evolution as a breadbasket and thoroughfare to India was not a
coincidence but a reflection of the growing needs and desires of the English empire. Cashstrapped and beset with the responsibilities of other territories, the British imagined immense
promise for Iraq as a self-sustaining territory - as long as efforts were maintained to manage the
rivers and irrigation so wheat and cotton could flourish. But discipline comes in many forms.
Surely, the Revenue Department could catalogue taxes and attempt to settle roving recalcitrant
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tribes with the prospect of wealth, but imperial transportation routes, particularly air, held other
advantages. For Britain’s wrath came swift and sure on the wings of a Vickers-Vimy.
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Technology as Discipline: Humanity of Aircraft and Shaikh Mahmoud
We are safe, except for risk of engine failure, for there are no enemy aircraft. But two of us,
in the only other Maurice Farman, have recently crashed in front of the Turkish trenches,
and are now prisoners, leaving Jumbo and me and the Flight Commander as young gods on
whom Fate depends. To us three, and only to us, the past, present and future of this country is
spread out like a map each morning.151

!

British imaginations of Mesopotamia as Eden or El Dorado, reified by a multiplicity of
travel literature, archeological digs, and geographic societies, formed the first half of a violent
dialectic that granted divine right and responsibility to the British. If resurrection was to be
achieved through development and modernism, tending and cultivation would be achieved
through airplanes. Therefore, the value of the plane was not restricted to its physical abilities to
discipline a population. Planes were physical manifestations of the British colonial project, flying
articulations of the modern that sanctioned violence against the primitive. They were the latest
mechanisms to embody the narrative of English supremacy and the latest conversation topics in
British high society.152
Negotiations - An Aerial Defense Scheme Takes Shape
Despite, Gertrude Bell’s warnings of rising nationalism throughout Mesopotamia, High
Commissioner A.T. Wilson overestimated popular support for the British. Tribes were becoming
discontent with London’s patronizing attitude, colonial policy, and taxes. In a letter to Percy Cox,
Gertrude Bell mentioned the failure of British administrators to create a concise political
objective in Mesopotamia by 1916, “The real difficulty here is that we don’t know exactly what
we intend to do in this country. Can you persuade people to take your side when you are not sure
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in the end whether you’ll be there to take theirs?”153 Undoubtedly, British interest in
Mesopotamia is best described as commercial and strategic. The MEF’s deployment and
continued expansion northward towards the Turkish border convoluted these aims.
Under Ottoman rule, Iraqis certainly had a history of semi self-governance. T.E.
Lawrence noted that under Turkish rule, seventy percent of the administration was composed of
Iraqis while sixty percent of the officers of the Army corps were Arab. In comparison the Civil
Administration during the Mandate did not have a single local in its employment.154 Frustration
boiled over and In May, 1920, joint Shi’a-Sunni demonstrations commenced by conducting the
mawlud and ta’ziyya together, an historic moment representing the materialization of a united
Shi’i-Sunni front against the colonial forces.155 Many of its leaders were former officers or
officials in the Ottoman army and administration. Displays of solidarity developed into open
rebellion and the Revolt of 1920, which began in Karbala and Najaf, spread through southern
Iraq and Kurdistan. The British estimated over 131,000 rebels were armed and as many as
17,000 had modern repeating rifles.156 It was the first time the region experienced large scale
aerial bombardment; in total, pilots flew 4,008 mission hours, fired 183,861 rounds, and dropped
97 tons of bombs.157 While the rebellion failed because of diminishing tribal finances,
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divisiveness, and the Royal Air Force, it was a poignant sign that inter-religious and tribal
barriers were not as formidable as thought.158
C.J. Edmonds and E.B. Soane were instrumental in brokering power by providing
financial and military assistance to amicable tribes.159 British policy in Mesopotamia adjusted
after the summer revolt and the French expulsion of Faisal in Syria.160 The years 1920-22
introduced a new phase of British control in Kurdistan as disorder was constantly present at the
distant periphery of Baghdad. British civil servants tried to forge political alliances with tribes in
northern Iraq. However, there was a stark difference; Historically, the Ottoman’s tried to weaken
tribes but the British empowered them. But these arrangements divorced tribal leaders and
sheikhs from their historical base of power - other townspeople and familial relations.161 This
also lead the Europeans to depend on continuous technical innovation as tribes came in
possession of their weapons.162
Effectively, Baghdad was too far away from Mosul to maintain security. After six months
of military action during 1920 London aspired to truncate its operations “to achieve political and
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military economies.”163 In fact, the financial state of Britain was so desperate that London
considered a complete withdrawal from Mesopotamia to terminate colonies from hemorrhaging
its assets. The Cairo Conference responded by establishing new policies that shifted military
responsibility from the army to the air force - a policy decision the army fiercely resisted. Both
branches submitted multiple proposals for the future control of Iraq but consensus between
offices was unattainable as most policy decisions had been.164
The RAF and the British Foreign Office in India were amicable to an aerial defense
scheme but the War Office staunchly resisted. In the wake of postwar debt, the British Empire
was in dire economic and financial straits and an air enforcement scheme was a preferable albeit
unconventional alternative. The War Office thoroughly disapproved such plans because its
generals disregarded any possibility that aircraft could maintain security in Mesopotamia. These
philosophical differences greatly influenced the modus operandi and proposals submitted by the
War Staff and RAF. The Air Command schemes were more attractive to the British War Cabinet
amidst a culture of monetary constraints. Thus, London did not implement a detailed air scheme
until the end of 1920.
While austerity was the initial justification for a military shift, the second reason was
increased capabilities of aircraft. Planes were highly effect despite pilots and navigators using
rudimentary tactics during the MEF. Between May of 1916 and the end of the year, the RFC
grew from five to twenty-four aircraft - mostly models B.E.2c (Blériot Experimental) and
163
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Martinsnyde (Snipe and Vickers-Vernon model aircraft replaced them soon thereafter).165
General Maude greatly valued their presence. Maude led the offensive on Baghdad during 1917
and used aircraft extensively. During the battle of Kut-al-Amara which began on September 26,
1917, aircraft dropped twenty-four bombs on a Turkish steamer that had been spotted during the
night. Lieutenant-General N.A. Marshall’s personal reconnaissance mission is, perhaps, the first
record of a senior British officer flying during combat.166 Maude and his senior staff increasingly
relied upon the junior officers of the Royal Flying Corps despite protestations that a single
squadron of poorly outfitted and antiquated aircraft was not sufficient.167 While aircraft were not
yet outfitted with wireless capabilities, navigators communicated with ground forces by dropping
handwritten notes attached to streamers. Such was the case when one plane warned General
Delamain about the Turkish General Nur-ad-din’s attempt to outflank the British advance on Kut
during the MEF campaign.168
But not everything was positive with airplanes during the 1914 campaign. Radiators
failed to cool engines and mechanics were forced to improvise until new parts arrived from
Britain. The Iraqi climate had physically distorted planes designed to fly in England’s more
temperate climate. The heat and humidity shrank their wooden frames or even disintegrated them
(Barker notes that 63 Squadron continued flying despite these set backs, conducting air-
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photography and reconnaissance trips for mapmaking).169 Since then, RAF aircraft and tactics
had improved drastically. Pilots and navigators learned and perfected navigation techniques and
training drastically improved. For example, when Yeats-Brown arrived from India and reported
for duty he had no navigational experience. Despite this (and never notifying his superiors), he
learned the simple codes of communication which consisted of firing red, blue, and white Verey
lights or flares. These signals communicated the accuracy of artillery strikes to battalions in the
rear. Bombers learned to glide towards their targets in order to achieve surprise.170 There would
be fewer limitations if the British could implement a comprehensive aerial scheme of dozen
squadrons equipped with the newest weapons and best aircraft.171
Thus, A.T. Wilson believed the RAF were the best suited force to maintain security in
Iraq. The performance of Indian and British troops had been underwhelming and loss at the Kut
still stung. He wrote, “ [the RAF] alone can reinforce Mesopotamia rapidly, and afford adequate
support to local forces at a distance from the centre in case of need.”172 Whatever misgivings
London had about implementing an aerial control scheme were quickly assuaged by the promise
of aircraft during the 1920 rebellion.173 If London’s colonial aristocrats needed any more
encouragement, they needed little persuading to adopt a defense scheme that exemplified the
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The Tigris above Jizre174
modern era and depicted the racial disparities between the “civilized” Brit and “primordial”
tribe.175 In 1927 for instance, Wing-Commander Norman Bottomley justified the tactics of air
policing at the Marlborough School for boys, “the more primitive a race is, the more it respects
sheer power.”176
The consequence of the Cairo Conference was a complete paradigm shift in governance
and Britain’s aspirations to install a functioning Arab bureaucracy. Feisal would become king and
maintain relations with Great Britain. While effective administrative governance was still
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Oak Forest near Rowanduz177
necessary, a comprehensive governmental scheme with developed institutions would be
expensive. Thus, the RAF became the highest judicial body - administering swift, clean, and
terrible punishment. As predicted, military expenditures declined drastically afterwards. In 1921
expenses exceeded £23 million. Britain spent a paltry £4 million five years later.178
Traditionally, the War Staff was cautious when determining troop estimates. From a
tactical perspective they desired a plethora of bases spread strategically and evenly across
territory. In the event of external invasion or uprising these bases could assist and reinforce one
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another; the scheme’s drawback was its reliance on high troop numbers.179 Relations between the
Royal Flying Corps (before the RAF became its own branch the RFC reported to the army) and
War Office had never been pleasant. The RAF and the War Office also disagreed about the
constitution of threats and their ability to cooperate. Externally, the British were concerned with
Turkish activity and highly cautious about Russian interventionism in the wake of a Bolshevik
revolution.180 Internally, should tribal factions become unified the British would be severely
outnumbered. However, Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff in Baghdad surmised that
both Kurd and Arab would remain disunited based on information available to the colonial
administration in 1921.181
Preliminary discussions outlined strategic aerodrome locations with respect to physical
and human geographies. Broadly speaking, British command identified three types of landscapes
and their suitability for airplanes: “The Plain — an area of cultivation in the neighborhood of the
rivers, the Desert of the West and South West, and the mountainous country of the North and
East.”182 British Intelligence graded each portion by their ability to be controlled. The
Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force formed the foundation of this knowledge. However, the
movements of the MEF were restricted to areas surrounding Basra and were inadequate to
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predict the future performance of aircraft which the British had not used until 1917 - one year
before the MEF’s conclusion.
The tall peaks of Iraq’s Northern mountains were disconcerting to strategists from the
outset of the occupation. Treacherous inclines and ravines cut through ridges decorated by large
quantities of scrub-oaks, ash, and poplars. Large thickets of willows grew along streams,
particularly in the southern reaches of the Kurdish mountains. Where trees were absent, dense
scrub grew abundantly, restricting the movement of individuals or livestock. Officers deemed
Kurdistan completely inaccessible to all forms of transportation, except for airplanes and
portions of the Tigris which could be reached upstream by steamboat. The rocky ground created
complications when identifying suitable aerodrome locations while the mountains discouraged
pilots from flying at low altitudes, necessary if they were to drop propaganda or bombs.
Responding to a lecture held by the Royal Society of Central Asia, Sir Arnold Wilson said that,
“ground conditions in the Middle East are distinctly more unfavorable than atmospheric
conditions. I am not so afraid when flying of what is in the air as of what is on the ground.”183
Navigator Yeats-Brown, who had served in the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force was the
earliest and most famous victim of ground disturbances:

!

Then I saw that our left wing-tip had crashed into a telegraph post. Even so, the
full extent of our disaster dawned slowly on me. I could not believe that we had broken
something vital. Yet the pilot was sure. The leading edge of the plane was broken. Our
flying days were finished. It had been my pilots misfortune far more than his fault that we
had crashed. The unexpected smoothness of the landing-ground and a rear wind that no
one could have foreseen had brought bout disaster. Nothing could be done. Nothing
remained - except to do our job.184
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Yeats-Brown and his pilot “Australian” White were subsequently captured by the Shammar
Arabs and held in Turkish captivity for two years.185 Wilson echoed this sentiment at another
lecture held by the Royal Central Asian Society:
The boundaries of Mesopotamia are almost as difficult to guard as its
communications. The boundary-line totals almost 2,000 miles - nowhere does it
follow a natural frontier. The high hills and the stony rocks of the desert are a
refuge, not an obstacle, to their inhabitants. To the forces of law and order, be they
Arab or British, they form an almost impassable barrier. The airplane alone can
and does rise triumphant to the occasion, and enables us to attack the denizens of
the desert and the hills in their lairs.186

!

Within Iraq’s narrative, the importance of aircraft cannot be understated. “I would say that the
Air Force in ‘Iraq at the present moment is like the cement in a building which keeps the bricks
together.”187
Humanity of Air Policing188
The British employed a variety of aerial tactics throughout their tenure in Iraq. Pilots flew
over tribal territory to passively warn “malcontents” of their displeasure. If they remained
uncooperative, aviators shot or bombed sheep and cattle herds. Afterwards, they applied intense
aerial bombardment on towns and villages.189 While used throughout Iraq, administrators
employed these disciplinary measures extensively in the mountainous regions of Iraqi Kurdistan
when British presence waned during the 1920’s.

185

Ibid, 196. On his captivity he writes on page 197, “I shall record only two incidents therefore: to write
more would be useless, to write less would be to fort that our of fourteen thousand prisoners of war in
Turkey only some three thousand returned to England. Barker also refers to this incident on page 127.
186

Wilson, Arnold. "Mesopotamia, 1914–1921." Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society 8, no. 3
(1921): 152.
187

Thomson, Lord. "My Impressions of a Tour in ‘Iraq." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 12.3
(1925): 220.
188

See, Satia.

189 AIR

23/569, “Telegram from Adviser, Arbil to Interior, Baghdad,” October 5th, 1922.

!74

Speaking at the Royal Central Asian Society in 1925, Lord Thomson reminisced about
the efficacy of an RAF scheme. As Amman was a small indefensible town, the Ikhwan raids of
1922-24 would have overrun Transjordan had the RAF been unavailable. The aircraft inspired a
terror too appalling for their calvary. Despite sustaining heavy losses, the Ikhwani calvary would
have experienced more had it not been for the awesome nature of modern aircraft:

!

No one wishes to glory in it once it has been done; but I think you will agree with
me…that unless some such punishment - as swift, as effective, as implacable, and
as terrible - had been applied (if humaner and slower methods had been resorted to),
the process of restoring order and making people respect frontiers in Arabia would have
been long drawn out, and in the end there would have ensued a great deal more suffering
to the people, and results would not have been achieved. I am inclined to think that the
men who took part in that invasion will never take part in another one.”190

Even the self-aware Political Officer of Sulaimaniyah, C.J. Edmonds, echoed the need for
displays of awesome power to control Kurds, “The Southern Kurd is easily set by the ears and
will fly before or give in to overwhelming force.”191 Such descriptions were commonplace and if
not always overt, positioned the Kurd as primitive while simultaneously self-justifying aerial
policing. These descriptions articulated the Kurd and Arab as sub-human, animalistic even.192
The tribes were like sheep without a shepherd and the English pilot delivered God’s wrath by
divine-right. Sir Arthur Harris, who served as leader of 45 Squadron believed the only thing
Arabs understood was “the heavy hand.” Chairman Viscount Peel, then Secretary of State for
India and former Under-Secretary of the War and Air Ministry supported Thomson’s sentiment:
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I was very much interested to hear - because one has heard it from other members
of the Air Force - of the great humanity of bombing. In fact, it was explained so clearly
by Lord Thomson that I believe it would even carry conviction to those persons who are
suffering themselves from a deluge of bombs.193

!

Stanford historian Priya Satia describes this process beautifully, “Their presence on the ground,
gathering intelligence that would facilitate accurate bombardment, also convinced some of the
regime’s humanity.”194 Those boasting in the ability of aircraft were quick to advocate the
technology as a “moral instrument.”195 While accurate precision bombing and advanced targeting
systems were still undeveloped, the discourses surrounding aerial police action are eerily similar
to drone use in the Global South today.
The colonialists did not only discipline tribal populations with bombing, but designed an
articulate air defense scheme that could provide many advantages over an expensive standing
army. From a secret memorandum that reads like a passage from Michel Foucault’s Discipline
and Punish, Air Staff wrote the following comments to London:196
The speed and range of aircraft makes it practicable to keep a whole country under more
or less constant surveillance. Frequent friendly patrols, dropping leaflets containing
suitable propaganda, disseminating correct news, and preventing the willful
misinterpretation of the orders of a political officer by intriguing headmen, may often
prevent the seeds of unrest being sown by irresponsible agitators. It must be remembered
that from the ground every in habitant of a village is under the impression that the
occupant of an airplane is actually looking at him, and the frequent and perhaps daily
appearance of aircraft apparently overhead will do much towards establishing the
impression that all their movements are being watched and reported.197
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The British prized the ability to maintain continuous or semi-continuous surveillance, a
newfound dialectic and technological apparatus in response to the nomadic or semi-nomadic
inhabitants of Iraq. Intelligence gathering was a two-pronged mechanism administered by the
RAF which gathered hard intel while simultaneously positioning the tribes as a site of
discipline.198 Ultimately, these hovering threats redefined power relations between Brit and tribe
for generations to come.
The seeds of a Kurdish rebellion were sown as early as the Paris Peace Conference of
1919 when the hopes of an independent Kurdish nation were pinned on the sanguine promises of
British officials. Sherif Pasha had been the Kurdish representative at the conference and was not
taken seriously despite protesting that the conference neglected questions of selfdetermination.199
The Lausanne Conference began in November of 1922, where the Turks and Brits
negotiated the frontier region and control of the Mosul wilayet. Because of diplomatic standoff,
both sides agreed to exclude the “Mosul Question” from negotiations, agreeing to reconvene in a
years time. If an agreement could not be made, the League of Nations would determine the
outcome.200
Concurrent with the Lausanne discussions, Turkish troops began concentrating near
Zakho, a town in the north bordering Turkey and Iraq. Secret pro-Turkish meetings were being
held among Kurdish leaders who exhibited a lack of trust in the British. In the east, the towns of
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Koi Sanjaq, Rowandiz, and Ranya composed a strategic triangle near the Persian border but were
evacuated by the British in August of 1922. Informal Turkish troops led by an individual named
Ramzi Bey took over the towns until 1925, fighting British troops and Kurdish tribes unwilling
to submit to Turkish authority.201
After August, the British concentrated on bombing the towns composing the the strategic
triangle around Lake Dukan, particularly Rowandiz. To some degree, the High Commissioner
was less concerned with Turkish troops inasmuch as the “prestige” lost among the local tribes.202
Cox recognized that reoccupying Koi Sanjaq would help restore their reputation but meanwhile,
requested Koi to receive “aerial treatment.”203 It was under such political circumstances that the
“Kurdish Question” dominated British military and political endeavors for the next two years.204
Shaikh Mahmud
Shaikh Mahmud was arguably the most prominent sadah (affluent Kurdish or Shi’i
landed class) in southern Kurdistan, certainly in Sulaimaniyyah, throughout the 1920’s until his
death in 1956.205 His father was Shaikh Sa’id of Barzinjah who, along with eighteen others, was
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murdered in Mosul in 1909.206 He was also a revered religious figure being spiritual leader of the
Qadiri brotherhood207 and self-proclaimed naqib or decedent of the prophet.208
He resisted British rule consistently from 1919 and was the largest internal threat to
British occupation in northeast Iraq.209 Relations between Shaikh Mahmud Barzinjah and Britain
began in 1919 and were tumultuous from the beginning. In the early years British officials
attempted to coopt his support hoping they could rule Kurdistan indirectly through the Shaikh.
Political Officer E.W. Noel had led these efforts. Although Noel was perceived as a brilliant
political officer, the Civil Administration thought E.B. Soane’s experiences and Machiavellian
personality would be more successful.210 However, in 1919 he took advantage of E.B. Soane’s
absence and declared himself King of Kurdistan after imprisoning Soane’s officers. General
Fraser engaged him in a pitched battle at the Bazyan Pass, where he was found shot in the liver
by RAF officer C.J. Edmonds.211 He was tended and subsequently exiled to Kuwait until his
return in 1922.212
The British reinstated Mahmud because the frontier became increasingly unstable. Not
only were Turkish troops being stationed around Rowandiz, the reforms of Riza Khan had
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rejuvenated the Persian army who recommenced operations against the Shikak tribe, located on
the Turkish-Persian boundary and led by Isma’il Agha ‘Simko.’213 The decision had been
controversial but the lack of British troops in Iraq’s Kurdish regions, accentuated by the RAF
command scheme adopted at the Cairo Conference, left few choices in the minds of British
administrators.214
On September 4th, the British decided to evacuate Sulaimaniyah and Koi Sanjaq due to
perceived increases of anti-British sentiment spread by Turkish propaganda. Karin Fattah Beg, a
local Kurdish agha who had recently killed two British officers, was being pursued by a column
of British and Iraqi levies. With the safety of their forces in question, twenty-six airplanes began
evacuating forces on the 5th.215 Furthermore, tribes such as the Dizai began forgoing taxes or
forcing the British to change rates of compensation for produce. In cooperation with armored
vehicles, Divisional Adviser of Kirkuk, W.A. Lyon responded by leading aerial demonstrations
through their country.216 Ultimately, the evacuation proved a fatal decision as the British never
fully reestablished their authority, for they betrayed the loyalty of Sulaimaniyah’s villagers to the
whims of Shaikh Mahmud.217
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He was also a terrifying. When he controlled Sulaimaniyah near the end of 1922 he
controlled the city and greeted visitors in front of a gallows after any weapons had been
confiscated. Police monitored potential dissidents including his own brother, Shaikh Qadir, who
was competing for power and had the loyalty of other less powerful Shaikhs. Few could leave
the city without permission and others were killed.218
Meanwhile, negotiations between A.T. Wilson and Mahmud continued, with political
officer and Major C.J. Edmonds acting as interlocutor. Both parties exchanged a series of
telegrams ordering him to come to Baghdad. If he failed to comply with this order, aircraft would
drop notices over Sulaimaniyah warning residents of an imminent bombing campaign.
Near the end of February, Baghdad was getting impatient and wanted to see results. They
proposed an ultimatum to Mahmud requesting his presence in Baghdad via Kirkuk. The Royal
Air Force threatened to bomb Sulaimaniyah if the towns leadership, specifically the members of
the maglis who were reinstated by the British as a concessionary move, did not comply. Bristol
fighters and Vickers-Vernons demonstrated over the town for several days as a show of force.
Any damages or injuries incurred by Sulaimaniyah’s inhabitants would lie at the hands of
Mahmud.219 Because Sulaimaniyah’s population was increasingly within British, Turkish, and
Kurdish crosshairs, the city’s population dwindled from twenty-thousand to approximately seven
hundred, refugees fleeing to neighboring towns and cities such as Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Erbil.220
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From the beginning, the English had hoped that Mahmud and Simko could cooperate and
reclaim control from Ramzi Bey who had an estimated two-hundred and fifty troops under his
command. These efforts proved futile with both Mahmud and Simko unwilling to cooperate with
each other. Shortly thereafter, the British learned in captured correspondence from Rowanduz
that Mahmoud’s planned to instigate a revolt against them despite “fervent protestations of
loyalty.”221 The Turks promised Mahmud an independent Kurdistan in exchange for his support.
In fact, his brother-in-law, Fattah Efendi, happened to be a former captain in the Turkish Army
and negotiated on behalf of both parties. When the Lausanne Conference finalized and delayed to
resolve delineating the frontier region for another year, Shaikh Mahmud took matters into his
own hands despite the nebulous promises of Kurdish autonomy made by the Turks.222
After experiencing a series of bombing raids, Shaikh Mahmud fled to Jasana Caves, a
region approximately fifty kilometers west of Sulaimaniyah and established his base of
operations. Jasana provided splendid cover from British bombers, easily resisting their twenty
pound Cooper bombs.223 Over two-hundred troops were located at Jasana, along with another
one-hundred at Kamchuga, fifty at Dukhan, and another forty that composed his personal
retinue.224 Former levies who the British recruited and were given machine guns joined the
Shaikh. Shaikh Mahmud collected taxes from tobacco and other sources in order to finance their
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resistance.225 This often meant villagers paying tax twice, once to Mahmud and again to the
British.226 Mahmud even brought a printing press and perhaps began the first nationalist Kurdish
publication titled, Bang-i Haqq or The Call of the Truth. The first issue contained a proclamation
of jihad.
In sorties composed of no less than three planes, the RAF attacked his positions with
several tons of bombs and fired thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition (SAA). Air staff
reported every quarter-ton of explosive dropped and every bullet fired.227 And if the location of
the sadah’s troops could not be effectively bombed, pilots turned their attention towards their
livelihoods: livestock. One such bombing raid was composed of twenty-six planes, which
dropped exactly 52 one-hundred twelve pound bombs and 184 twenty pound bombs on
unsuspecting sheep and cattle.228 This tactic was developed and frequently used against villages
resisting to comply with British authority. Flocks and herds were owned collectively as Kurdish
aghas let the semi-feudal population raise their sheep or cattle.229 Such brutal tactics worked
against the Pizhdar,230 a powerful tribe located near the Persian border. Initially they supported
Mahmud and were bombed. Afterwards, they refused aid in January, 1923 to Shaikh Mahmud
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and retreating Turkish soldiers.231
Such “concerns” with “ethical bombing” is juxtaposed by concurrent operations in the
city of Sammara. A similar situation was unfolding when malcontent Shaikhs Albu Ali, Albu
Alga, and Albu Hazazza of Kirkuk, Sammara, and Baqubah respectively, failed to report to their
mutasarrifs. Pilots dropped messages warning tribes of impending military action if these
individuals failed to show:

!

As the time in which to give the tribes final warning is short, I am to request that His
Excellency the High Commissioner be moved to ask Air Headquarters to have messages
too all leaders of these tribes dropped from aeroplaces [sic] on all the encampments lying
North of Adhaim on both sides of the Jabbal Hamrin, including Aith.232

Iraqi columns would occupy the area and High Commissioner Percy Cox emphasized twice in a
confidential memorandum to the Ministry of Interior:

!

His Excellency the High Commissioner is not aware of the nature of the military action
which it is proposed to take should the tribal leaders concerned not comply with the
summons to come in, nor does he wish to criticize the measures which the ‘Iraq
Government may take for the preservation of law and order.233

Cox effectively granted permission to both the RAF and Iraqi levies to preserve security by any
means necessary, and was not concerned with the details.
At this point, government authority in the Sulaimaniyah liwa was near non-existent. Halfhazard political allegiances with tribal aghas were used to maintain a semblance of authority in
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the city. Eventually, Shaikh Mahmud reoccupied the town in July of 1922 after an idle period
occasionally disturbed by pitched battles and bombings. He remained there with nearly two
hundred men and continued colluding with the Turks where, “action was taken to attempt to
bring him to proper perspective.”234 Edmonds notes that it was against Mahmud during August
1923 that the British first used the newly developed 220 pound bomb.235 The RAF was steadily
improving its tactics and technology by evaluating performance and testing new methods
throughout Iraq.
Meanwhile, the British continued aerial assaults on the strategic triangle, centering much
of their effort on the town of Koi Sanjak or Koi. Abbas Mahmud of the Pishdar had supported
Shaikh Mahmud but “passively” allowed the British to occupy the town after Turkish soldiers
retreated.236 This led to negotiations between Mahmud and the British, aiming to secure the area
before winter of 1922. In addition to temporary occupying Koi, Baghdad decided to hire local
levies and bomb the nearby town of Rowanduz continuously.237 A small strike-force composed of
one hundred elite British soldiers and local police while Ninjak planes would cover their
approach Afterwards, the British retreated and Sowar Agha Pirani and his force of local levies
would act as a deterrent force. Coordinated attacks between ground and air forces became
normal and illustrates the development of air and ground tactics to work in concert.238
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In February of 1923, five Vickers-Vernons of 70 and 45 Squadron two companies of the
14 Sikhs, which comprised 320 Indian soldiers and two British officers.239 This was remarkable
for two reasons. The British intended to continue securitizing the North-West Frontier from
Shaikh Mahmud and Turks in the midst of the Lausanne Conference. Any military victory would
grant them an edge in negotiations, a strategy that was confirmed within intercepted Turkish
correspondence.240 Shaikh Mahmud was bombed shortly thereafter, fleeing from Sulaimaniyah
with two-hundred men and the town’s treasury.241
Additionally, this was the first time the British and had transported an entire group of
soldiers en masse. The conference had begun in November of 1922 and was only finalized nine
months later in July of 1923. By May of 1923, both the British and Turks were at a standstill.
Turkish soldiers were still present at Rowanduz and the British continued bombing the town
unabatedly. Turkey’s southern border was finalized and ceded the rights to Mosul and Shaikh
Qadir, the rival brother whom Mahmud had attempted to kill, received support and the
nomination to become a member for the Constituent Assembly of Iraq.242
Qualifying the Efficacy of Planes
A high degree of bravado exists in the memoirs of pilots and administrators. The British
played God on the throes of aerial and technological advancement. Sir Percy Sykes dictated a
story at the RGS about the inhabitants of Bandar Abbas, Iran and their first airplane encounter.
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Flying in Sulaimaniyah Valley243

!

Allegedly, they were so fearful that they fell on their knees and confessed their sins to the pilots,
believing Judgment Day had arrived.244 Furthermore, this chapter’s epigraph points to the sense
of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience pilots felt. Colonial administrators subscribed
to the efficacy of planes to such a degree that they often exaggerated their ability and understated
the fighting prowess of the Kurds or Arabs:
Some months before our visit the activities of a certain sheikh in the neighborhood had
been such that the majority of the inhabitants of this town had fled; in fact, the population
was reduced to something like seven hundred of the original inhabitants, the remainder
were refugees…Eventually action had to be taken against this sheikh. To put it bluntly, he
was bombed; he was cleared out, and he is still living as an outlaw in the mountains.245
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However, Kurdish and Arab forces developed tactics that dampened the effectiveness of planes.
At this point in history, planes had little or no navigational equipment meaning that pilots flew
strictly by sight. Villagers quickly learned that pilots rarely flew nighttime sorties and took
advantage of these shortcomings. Thus, townspeople abandoned villages that became focal
points for bombing throughout the day and returned at night.246 The rocky Northwest Frontier
provided the perfect cover for Kurdish scouts who warned villages of an oncoming attacks with
smoke signals.247 And sometimes aircraft proved counterproductive. In a report by the Air Staff
in Baghdad, they conceded that it is “unreasonable to expect an enemy to leave his trenches
while he is actually being bombed and exchange his position for one less safe…”248 Thus, the
RAF would have to cease bombing operations and allow the enemy to evacuate their tactical
position.
During the Arab and Kurd uprising of 1920, tribes destroyed eight aircraft and severely
damaged another forty-two, “so badly…they had to be dismantled and rebuilt in the aircraft
park…”249 Ignoring these statistics, a British officer proclaimed in 1923 that tribesmen would
preserve their ammunition in the presence of aircraft because they were so difficult to hit.250 The
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only way to properly describe this claim is fallacious. Examples of tribesmen damaging or
destroying aircraft are numerous in operation records.251
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CONCLUSION
While much of this thesis addresses historical abstract concepts like Biblicality,
technological innovation, and other aspects of colonial statecraft more broadly, the consequences
of such policy permeates the historical (or ahistorical) consciousness of Iraq today. Such were
my endeavors from the onset of this thesis - to create an historically based project addressing, in
part, tangible and prevailing realities of Iraq.
A series of monumental shifts have occurred in Iraq over the course of writing this thesis.
The borders drawn by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot remain a defining subtext in
ISIL’s struggle to establish a modern caliphate. Al-Hayat, the media wing for ISIL, published two
videos titled, The End of Sykes-Picot and Kasr al-Hudud (its Arabic counterpart).252
An important caveat - this thesis does not argue that Iraq’s borders are artificial. In fact, it
claims quite the opposite. In recent years, news pundits, journalists, and even scholars have
perpetuated notions of Iraq’s artificiality, arguing that Iraq is the byproduct of both colonial and
neocolonial forces. There is merit in such notions - to dismiss French, British, and Ottoman
influence is scholarly fallacy. Indeed, the majority of this thesis highlights the visions of British
aristocracy and the architects of prestigious societies such as the RGS and RCAS. However,
political agents have used the myth of artificiality to justify incursions and colonial occupations
for decades. In fact, these justifications fueled British occupation throughout the Mandate Period,
providing further recourse for prolonged British influence in light of Iraq’s heterogeneous
population and geography. In 1932, the same year Iraq gained formal independence, King Faysal
even made such proclamations:
252
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In my opinion, and I say this with a heart full of sorrow, an Iraqi people does not yet exist in Iraq.
There are only throngs of human beings lacking any national consciousness, immersed in
religious traditions and falsehoods, disunited, susceptible to evil, inclined towards anarchy, and
always prepared to rise up [against] any government whatsoever.253

!

Such sentiment is clearly ahistorical and fails to give agency to pro-Iraqi nationalist parties such
as Haras al-Istiqlal (Guardians of Independence), Jamyat al-Ahd (Covenant Society), among
others, who aided the 1920 Arab revolt (Chapter Three). Moreover, this discourse fails to
acknowledge Britain’s use of Ottoman maps, which were, in fact, based on historical realities.
Rather, Iraq’s borders are a consequence of prolonged political negotiation, war, and violence
between a myriad of different state and non-state actors.
Perhaps the most salient critique concerning Iraq’s artificiality centers on the inclusion of
the Mosul governorate.254 This is represented by the oft-mentioned phrase, “the Mosul Question”
within colonial documents and the subsequent occupation of Mosul several days after the
Armistice of Mudros. But current narrations fail to posit “the Mosul Question” as an IraqiTurkish issue. Instead, Mosul’s inclusion sparks discussion surrounding the “unnaturalness” of
Iraqi borders, frequent counter-proposals being a separate ethnocentric state for Mosul, flowing
West towards Syria. Ironically, both Western pundits and ISIL support this ahistorical and
fallacious discourse (see aforementioned videos The End of Sykes-Picot and Kasr al-Hudud).
Anyone traveling to 18th or 19th century Mosul would be struck by its degree of heterogeneity.
It had been inhabited by Sunni, Shi’i, Chaldeans, Jews, Nestorians, Yezidis, Armenians,
Catholics, Protestants, Assyrians, Jacobites, and Greek Orthodox groups. In fact, far more Kurds
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called Mosul home than Arabs.255 Both Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein oversaw
Arabization policies of the Mosul governorate, which included the city of Kirkuk, attempting to
gain control of its oil resources.256 Thus, new maps of Iraq often divide it ethnographically and
are, at best, rooted in spurious historical claims.
This research begins its intervention near the end of the 1910’s after the end of World
War I, a formative period for many places, Iraq not withstanding. Iraq captured British
consciousness and became the latest symbol of British benevolence, progress, and power.
Mesopotamia, as it was popularly known, gave Her Majesty’s government another chance to
prove its clemency in the wake of postwar disillusionment. Reviving the Garden of Eden proved
the perfect excuse for an aristocracy seeking to diminish German and Ottoman influence while
simultaneously ensuring a buffer zone for the Empire’s crown jewel, India.
Thankfully, the tools to resurrect an Iraqi nation were available in the age of Modernism.
As the second chapter shows, development was a violent process that was encompassed by racial
theory and discourse. Rather, development of Iraq was not bred by British altruism but a highly
complex system seeking to discipline the Nation in a highly Foucaultian manner. For example,
agricultural reform and the introduction of labor intensive crops such as wheat and cotton would
generate more revenue while anchoring the unruly and transitive Bedouin tribes.
Of course, modern feats of science and engineering provided the Mandate government
with the means to discipline the countryside less innocuously. Aircraft capabilities had improved
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drastically throughout the Great War and continued doing so during the British occupation.
Planes empowered the cash-strapped Brits to establish authority with minimal manpower. As the
campaign against Shaikh Mahmud in 1924 demonstrates, these aircraft were not primitive but
highly capable, equipped with a variety of bombs and incendiaries. Airbases spread throughout
the northern frontier projected British power from Iran to Mosul. These campaigns proved to be
antecedents for later violations of air sovereignty. In 1923, a pilot named Arthur Harris took
command of 45 Squadron, which as of February that year, was based in Baghdad with a forward
detachment in Mosul. He earned the nickname “Bomber” Harris, increasing the multitude of
raids against recalcitrant tribes in North-West Iraq. He is credited with inventing the heavy
bomber, supporter of area bombing, and later the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) during the
Allied bombing of Dresden in 1945.257 Indeed, no country’s history is more enmeshed with these
birds of prey than Iraq.
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LOCATION OF SQUADRONS258
Where squadrons of the Royal Air Force were located as of February 28th, 1923:
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Air HQ, British Forces in Iraq - Baghdad
HQ Basrah Group - Basrah
Station Commandant, Hinaidi - Hinaidi, Baghdad
Iraq Aircraft Depot - Hinaidi, Baghdad
Wing HQ - Mosul
No. 1 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul
No. 6 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Kirkuk
No. 8 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul
No. 30 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul
No. 45 Squadron - Baghdad with forward detachment at Mosul
No. 55 Squadron - Mosul
No. 70 Squadron - Hinaidi, Baghdad
No. 84 Squadron - Shaibah
Stores Depot, RAF - Basrah
Accounts Office, RAF - Baghdad
R.E. Services, Iraq - Baghdad
Rest Camp - Basrah
RAF Prison - Basrah
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